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This thesis explores the multiple ways identity can be affected by dementia. It primarily 
concerns how ‘personal identity’ is affected in the early to moderate stages of dementia, and 
secondarily concerns how ‘personhood’ can be threatened in the late stages of dementia. When 
a patient’s personal identity or personhood is called into question due to their dementia, there 
are significant practical implications for their health and moral status. These can include issues 
involving autonomy, implementation of advanced directives and right to treatment. It is 
important to consider these issues given the increasing rates of dementia in developed countries 
and the substantial burden of disease this has on healthcare systems. Descriptive accounts of 
‘identity’, ‘memory’ and ‘dementia’ are provided to inform discussion of these issues. 
Distinctions are drawn between ‘object’ and ‘agency’ theories of identity, ‘archival’ and 
‘process’ models of memory, and ‘frontotemporal’ and ‘non-frontotemporal’ dementia 
subtypes. An agency theory of personal identity, which emphasises a person’s relationships 
and meaningful actions, is put forward as the more suitable approach to these problems, as it 
aligns better with the emerging process model of memory and better explains the direct and 
indirect ways dementia can affect a person’s identity. The findings of a qualitative study 
interviewing experienced health care professionals about these issues are also reported. This 
study found clinicians’ approaches to be broadly supportive of conclusions drawn by the 
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Dementia refers to a collection of chronic progressive brain diseases that affect cognitive 
functioning in significant ways. Dementia is most common in elderly populations but is 
not a normal process of aging. As such, dementia prevalence in New Zealand and other 
developed countries is rising due to aging populations. Healthcare workers are already 
faced by ethical challenges that arise with dementia and the occurrence of these will only 
increase in coming years. It is important to give them thorough consideration in order to 
approach the care of people living with dementia in an ethically appropriate way. In this 
thesis I focus on how dementia affects a person’s identity and the problems that arise 
when one’s identity comes into question as a result of dementia.  
The ethical problems related to identity in dementia can be categorised into two groups. 
This thesis primarily concerns the first group of problems, centring around the notion of 
‘personal identity’, i.e. the question of what is required for a particular person to remain 
who they are. It concerns the idea that we remain ourselves despite whatever changes we 
go through in our lives – the idea that who we are somehow endures. Issues of personal 
identity generally concern people in the early to moderate stages of dementia. They are 
reflected in some of the stigma and fear surrounding dementia, e.g. that dementia brings 
about ‘the loss of one’s self’, and become especially relevant when considering a person’s 
decision making capacity. They may concern the idea that the self can be lost or 
diminished, or the more radical notion the self has completely changed through dementia 
and is replaced by a different self. Such problems typically arise when a person with 
dementia has abrupt shifts in attitude or behaves in significantly uncharacteristic ways. 
The challenges that can follow are perhaps most acutely felt by those who live with or are 
close to the dementia sufferer, but include a range of clinical questions as well, 
particularly in the use of advanced care plans and directives. The second group of 
problems centres around the ethical concept of ‘personhood’. This is the concept of what 
qualities or attributes something needs to have in order to hold ‘moral status’. It is 
sometimes suggested that people in late stage dementia, with minimal cognitive 
functioning, have ceased to be ‘persons’, and hence no longer have the same moral status 
as those of us who are persons. Numerous practical problems can be related to this 
question. In particular, there is debate about what duties we bear to those with advanced 
dementia, and whether it is morally necessary to continue providing life-sustaining 
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treatments. These issues are related to identity in the sense that people asking them are 
often wondering whether a particular person is ‘still there’. However, the issues tend to 
be addressed in terms of what persons in general have in common. Due to the limited 
scope of this thesis and the complexity of the issues surrounding personhood, my 
arguments will be cursory in nature. 
These issues have received considerable attention in bioethical literature, and various 
cases have been put forward to illustrate what they involve. I will introduce some of these 
here, and return to them later in my discussion (principally in Chapter Four). The first is 
from Ronald Dworkin’s influential book, Life’s Dominion. It concerns a woman called 
‘Margo’, as described by a medical student called Firlik: 
The apartment had many locks to keep Margo from slipping out at night and 
wandering in the park in a nightgown, which she had done before. Margo said 
she knew who Firlik was each time he arrived, but she never used his name, and 
he suspected that this was just politeness. She said she was reading mysteries, 
but Firlik “noticed that her place in the book jumps randomly from day to day; 
dozens of pages are dog eared at any given moment ... Maybe she feels good 
just sitting and humming to herself, rocking back and forth slowly, nodding off 
liberally, occasionally turning to a fresh page.” Firlik was confused, he said, by 
the fact that “despite her illness, or maybe somehow because of it, Margo is 
undeniably one of the happiest people I have ever known.”1  
Margo’s case is in many respects typical of patients with mild to moderate dementia. For 
some people, the cognitive deficits Margo exhibits – the wandering behaviour and 
disorganised thinking – amount to a loss of self. In discussion of this case, Dworkin posits 
the question of what to do if before developing dementia, Margo had written an advanced 
directive refusing medical treatment if she were to be in such a condition. As Dworkin 
notes, it is not immediately clear whether this advanced directive should be enforced. 
Given Margo’s apparent happiness, one might well suppose that she still values her life, 
and so one might think it right to take reasonable measures to preserve her life. However, 
if we suppose Margo is no longer able to make autonomous decisions (if she is ‘not herself’ 
as some would hold), and if respect for autonomy is an important value, then it will seem 
that we should follow the decision she made prior to falling into this state. 
                                                 
 
1 Dworkin, Ronald. Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. 1993. 
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A different kind of case is described by Agnieszka Jaworska in her article, Respecting the 
margins of agency: Alzheimer’s patients and the capacity to value. It concerns a man called 
‘Mr O’Connor’: 
Mr. O’Connor was a deeply religious man for whom thoughts of taking his own 
life or of withholding lifesaving measures for whatever reason were completely 
unacceptable. In his seventies he developed Alzheimer’s disease. He lost his 
ability to do many of the things he used to enjoy, such as playing the piano; 
soon he could no longer take care of himself. With the loss of capacity for 
complex reasoning, most of his religious beliefs gradually faded away. Then 
came a terrible emotional blow: the death of his wife. He has now begun saying 
that he does not want to go on, that he does not want to live. His daughters no 
longer know what would be best for him: Should they make decisions for him 
based on his earlier life-philosophy or should they respect and take seriously his 
current wishes?2 
This case is an interesting contrast to Margo, as Mr O’Connor’s pre-morbid wishes and 
apparent wishes living with dementia undergo the opposite transition to Margo’s, 
however, the problem is structurally the same. The significant changes in his behaviour 
and attitude, both regarding his views on treatment and his religious beliefs, could be 
regarded as evidence that his decision making capacity is impaired by dementia. Yet as 
with Margo, if this is true then it seems that respect for autonomy requires us to uphold 
his prior wishes and disregard his current quality of life. This needs some consideration, 
as it seems unsatisfactory (and perhaps even wrong) to simply ‘write-off’ the present 
experiences of both of these people. Jaworska’s view is people who are moderately 
demented, like Margo and Mr O’Connor, can still be regarded as partially autonomous, 
and that respecting autonomy should include taking account of how they value their 
current situation. I will provide the detail of Jaworska’s argument later in the discussion. 
My purpose here is to outline the questions that cases of dementia can raise for our 
understanding of identity.  
The third case is from an article written by Tony Hope:  
Mr D taught classics at a boy’s preparatory school. He loved music and played 
the piano. He married at 25 years of age and has had two daughters. He retired 
                                                 
 
2Jaworska, Agnieszka. "Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer's Patients and the Capacity to Value." 
Philosophy Public Affairs 28, no. 2 (1999): 105-38. 
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at age 63 because his workload was beginning to become too much for him. 
Soon after retirement he was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. At first he 
enjoyed retirement, but life gradually became more difficult. After about a year 
he became less affectionate to his wife. Things deteriorated to the point where, 
for the first time in their married lives, they slept in separate beds. As time went 
on he started to do less and less. His indifference to his wife started to become 
active hostility and this hostility became directed to his daughters as well. About 
4 years after retirement he wandered out of the house when his wife was out 
shopping. The police brought him back after complaints that he was ‘molesting 
little girls’. Apparently he had said some things to a group of schoolgirls in a 
shop and the shopkeeper was concerned and called the police. His physical 
aggression has never extended beyond pushing his wife away. He can feed 
himself and is fully continent. There are times when he appears to know who 
she is, but for much of the time he does not appear to know her. 
His wife’s attitude towards him has changed radically over the years. At first 
she did not see the changes as being the result of an illness – she thought that he 
had ceased to love her. The second stage was when she accepted he was ill and 
that he needed her help. But over the last year her attitude has changed again ... 
She says that he must go into a home permanently. ‘I don’t see why I should 
have him in the house at all. It’s like living with a stranger. He’s not the man I 
married – that man has been dead for at least two years.’ 3 
This case presents a particular challenge if we accept Jaworska’s view that people with 
mild to moderate dementia retain some autonomy. While Mr D seems cognitively better 
off than Margo and Mr O’Connor, his wife’s view is that he is no longer ‘himself’. More 
precisely, she says he is a completely different person. If we conclude that Margo and Mr 
O’Connor are still in some respects themselves, but Mr D is not, then this difference needs 
to be explained. Why would it be that in some cases identity is maintained through 
dementia, and in other cases it is not? To answer this question, we need some explanation 
of how personal identity is constituted, and a more detailed account of the ways dementia 
can affect us.  
In this thesis, I bring together classic theories of identity with contemporary clinical and 
neuroscientific understandings of dementia and its primary symptoms in an effort to 
provide some answer to the questions raised by these cases. I will argue that theories of 
identity that centre on the persistence of certain ‘objects’ are mistaken, and that these 
                                                 
 
3 Hope, Tony. "Personal Identity and Psychiatric Illness." Philosophy, Psychology and Psychiatry, 1994, 131-44. 
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theories incline us to overstate the extent to which identity is lost through dementia. 
Within this argument, I highlight how the dominant understanding of memory – currently 
being overhauled in the contemporary science of memory – has reinforced this mistaken 
view of identity. I then argue that in place of these ‘object’ theories we should adopt 
theories that centre on interdependent agency, i.e. theories that view the self as 
fundamentally an agent endeavouring to maintain an array of meaningful connections. 
Such theories shift attention from questions of whether the dementia sufferer retains 
certain thoughts or is still capable of particular functions, and considers instead a 
person’s ability to act as themselves. 
To complement this theoretical discussion of identity, I report on the findings of a 
qualitative study undertaken as part of the dissertation project. In this study I 
interviewed seven participants with significant clinical experience in various dementia 
care settings. The interviews were 50 to 70-minutes, semi-structured and explored the 
participants’ views on the questions raised by the cases described and also the theoretical 
responses I was developing. The purpose of this study was to further test the clinical 
relevance of the problem presented in the literature, and to develop the ideas about 
identity that I wanted to put forward. Overall, the participants were supportive of the 
position arrived at in the theoretical discussion, though their views diverged on certain 
issues, and some participants appeared to vacillate in their positions throughout the 
interview. This highlights the complexity of the issues discussed and the need for 
theoretical work. 
The thesis is structured as follows: In Chapter One I provide an overview of several major 
theories of identity, divided into theories of personhood and personal identity, and briefly 
review arguments for and against each one. The section of personal identity will be 
further divided into ‘object’ theories which conceive identity as persisting through some 
object and ‘agency’ theories which consider identity to be formed and expressed through 
actions and choices. In Chapter Two I address the concept of memory, and outline how 
the academic understanding of memory is shifting, based on current neuro-physiological 
and psychological science. As will become clear, the concept of memory is highly relevant 
to theories of identity and the clinical course of dementia, as it is often maintained that 
memory provides the psychological continuity necessary for personal identity, and it is 
also generally regarded as the cognitive function most profoundly affected by the 
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common forms of dementia. In Chapter Three I describe the current epidemiological data 
relating to dementia, a typical clinical course, as the symptomology and pathophysiology 
of different dementia subtypes. Examining the differences in these dementia types will be 
important when considering how memory, identity and dementia intersect. In Chapter 
Four I will reconsider the theories of identity described in Chapter One in light of the 
discussions of Chapters Two and Three. I will explore the likely origins of the ethical 
problems with identity in a dementia context, and indicate how a change in the ways we 
think about these key concepts may improve how we care for people living with 
dementia. This is where I will make my main argument against object theories in favour 
of agency theories. I will also outline what these theoretical moves mean for the cases 
described above. In Chapter Five, I will report on the qualitative study, and discuss how 
the accounts of clinicians align with the ideas of the previous chapters. I will finally 
conclude by offering closing remarks and indicate areas for further investigation. 
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Chapter One - Identity 
Identity is a difficult concept that philosophers, psychologists and sociologists have debated 
over for many years. The difficulty is partly due to the fact that the term ‘identity’ is used to 
refer to a range of different concepts that, while connected, are distinct. In this chapter I will 
discuss two such concepts, which I will describe as ‘personhood’ and ‘personal identity’. It is 
important to be aware of the distinction between these concepts, as they are implicated in very 
separate sets of questions and dilemmas that can arise in cases of dementia. Broadly speaking, 
personhood involves questions derived from “what we are,” whereas personal identity concerns 
“who we are.” Discussions of identity can easily conflate these concepts (as indicated by some 
quotes in Chapter Five). Further difficulty arises from the fact that each of these concepts is 
ambiguous in its own right. While most people will have some intuitive sense of what they 
mean, most also find it difficult to provide precise definitions that stand up to critical analysis. 
The following discussion will help minimise confusion and provide a foundation for arguments 
made for and against particular theories of identity in Chapter Four.  
 Personhood 
Considerations of identity often concern what I will refer to here as the concept of personhood. 
In philosophical and ethical literature, personhood typically refers to the status of being ‘a 
person’. It is the concept by which we separate persons from non-persons. Being a person is 
associated with having a certain ‘dignity’, and with that rights and responsibilities. It includes 
living in a moral community made up of other persons. Questions of personhood usually 
involve variations of “what are we?”, “at what point do we start being persons?”, “when do we 
stop being persons?”, and “what makes persons different from non-persons?” These questions 
make personhood an essential consideration in a wide range of important ethical and legal 
issues, including abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, slavery and other human rights. For 
example, justification for abortion relies heavily on the idea that a foetus is not a person (or at 
least not a person in the same way that a child is a person). Historically, practices such as 
slavery have been justified by the notion that those who are enslaved do not hold the same 
status of the enslavers. For our discussion of dementia, the main question of personhood is 
whether late stage dementia can destroy the person qua person, or whether it can affect 
personhood in some other profound way. The qualities and criteria required for personhood are 




 Human criterion 
In building an account of personhood, some theorists infer from the strong intuitive sense that 
“persons are human” that everything that is a human is also a person. This approach will tend 
to find the criteria for personhood in that which is biologically distinctive about humans, e.g. 
human resemblance or human DNA. John Noonan has put forward one version of the view, 
arguing that to be considered a person, you simply must be human, and this for him means 
being conceived by human parents.4 While this view rules out the possibility of non-human 
persons e.g. aliens or machines with artificial intelligence, it also ‘rules in’ beings such as 
unborn foetuses, anencephalic babies, patients in persistent unresponsive states, and perhaps 
even human cadavers. All of these have been conceived by human parents, and possess human 
DNA. While the conclusion that a foetus is a person will be agreeable to those who, like John 
Noonan, hold pro-life views in abortion debates, many view these other kinds of human beings 
as non-persons, or perhaps as not-yet-persons, or past-persons. It seems clear at least that 
persons are different from dead bodies, as they receive very different moral consideration.5 So, 
while all these beings are biologically human, there is debate about which of these, if any, 
should be regarded as persons. To push this argument one step further, all cells within my body 
contain human DNA, but it seems incorrect to award personhood to a collection of skin cells, 
or say, a severed toe, even though these examples are undeniably human. So, it seems evident 
that personhood is about something more than just being genetically human. It is clear that the 
biological criteria alone will not settle the issue. 
 Cognitive criterion 
A number of classical and contemporary philosophers have maintained that personhood is 
dependent upon a cognitive criterion, i.e. being capable of a certain set of cognitive functions. 
For instance, classic British empiricist John Locke said that a person is: 
a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as 
itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that 
                                                 
 
4 Noonan, John Thomas. "An Almost Absolute Value in History." In The Morality of Abortion; Legal and 
Historical Perspectives, 51-59. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970. 
5 A cadaver is of course generally treated with respect. Moral significance extends beyond just persons, but persons 
are clearly given more moral consideration and responsibility than dead bodies. Rights to basic needs like food 
and water are a part of being a person and it would be ridiculous to grant these rights to a dead body. 
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consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to 
it.6  
For Locke, it seems that the essential cognitive function is self-awareness through a continued 
consciousness so that one can recognise past and future actions as their own.  
Another modern proponent of a cognitive criterion is philosopher Mary Anne Warren, who 
puts forward a similar view to Locke’s. She offers an extended list of five traits that she views 
as most central to the concept of personhood: consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, 
communication and self-awareness.7 She clarifies that any one of these traits is not necessary 
for personhood, and acknowledges that consciousness, reason and self-motivated activity may 
indeed be sufficient. However, on her account, if a being is unable to fulfil any of these criteria, 
they cannot be considered a person. This view appears to exclude foetuses, anencephalic babies 
and those in varying states of ‘brain death’, and fits with many people’s existing intuitions. 
However, it may also exclude some beings that are widely regarded as persons. For example, 
children in the first few months of life do not fulfil many of these criteria, if any at all: they 
sleep for large portions of the day (minimally conscious) and have not yet developed reasoning, 
self-motivated activity, communication or self-awareness. Yet we generally include infants in 
our moral community and treat them as persons. The same could be said for people with severe 
mental impairments.  
An alternative cognitive criterion comes from enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant, who 
emphasises a person’s capacity for autonomy. On his account, the actions of non-persons are 
entirely dependent upon that being’s particular nature i.e. they act entirely on their natural 
desires or inclinations. In contrast, persons are able to choose actions on the basis of moral 
requirements.8 As such, we do not regard non-persons as immoral for acting according to their 
nature. For example, if a factory worker loses their life due to unfortunately falling into a 
machine, it would seem ridiculous to ‘punish’ the machine. However, persons should be 
punished if they choose to act immorally. For example, if someone pushes our unfortunate 
factory worker into this dangerous machine, they definitely should be punished.  
                                                 
 
6 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, b2, c27 ; paragraph 9 
7 Warren, Mary Anne. "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion." Monist 57, no. 1 (1973): 43-61. 
8 See Kant, Immanuel, and Mary J. Gregor. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge, U.K.: 




Contemporary bioethicist Peter Singer offers a utilitarian perspective, influenced by 
philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick. In his view, 
moral significance arises from a being’s capacity to hold preferences and to feel pleasure and 
pain (where success or failure in achieving those preferences may be critical). As holding 
preferences requires rationality, autonomy and self-consciousness, Singer draws the conclusion 
that “only a person could have a right to life”9. However, he regards the species of a being as 
unimportant when considering personhood, and states that “there could be a person who is not 
a member of our species. There could also be members of our species who are not persons”10. 
Singer follows this argument to quite provocative conclusions. Not only does he argue that 
foetuses should not be regarded as persons, like Warren, but also extends the same regard to 
infants and profoundly intellectually disabled humans, as these beings also fail to fulfil his 
criteria for personhood.11 Moreover, he argues that some animals, such as gorillas, appear to 
fulfil these criteria and thus should be extended the moral consideration of personhood. There 
is a possible interpretation here that Singer is suggesting the relegation of the rights of infants 
and intellectually disabled humans to the current standard held by non-human animals. Singer 
addresses this by maintaining that “the aim of [his] argument is to elevate the status of animals 
rather than to lower the status of any humans”12. He also adds a caveat in suggesting that the 
moral questions about personhood should be regarded as independent of the legal outcomes, 
stating that “[t]here is some plausibility in the view that, for legal purposes, because birth 
provides the only sharp, clear and easily understood line, the law of homicide should continue 
to apply from the moment of birth.”13  
 Significance criterion 
Contemporary philosopher Charles Taylor has argued that the kinds of criteria put forward by 
Warren and Locke are not enough to differentiate human agents from non-human agents, such 
as animals and machines that are able to exhibit complex and adaptive behaviours. This 
conclusion seems to align with Peter Singer’s views, although Singer sees this as a reason to 
                                                 
 
9 Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. p82 
10 Singer, Practical Ethics, p74 
11 A contrasting argument could be that infants and foetuses are indeed conscious, under a definition of 
consciousness that focuses on a being’s ability to respond to environmental stimuli. However, this definition of 
consciousness is also necessarily extended to animals and indeed plants which are equally capable of responding 
to stimuli. It seems that this definition of consciousness, is no more helpful in determining personhood if a 
distinction is to be maintained between the moral status of foetuses and plants. 
12 Singer, Practical Ethics, p67 
13Singer, Practical Ethics, p153 
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elevate the moral status of animals, rather than reconsider the framework of personhood. In 
place of a cognitive criterion, Taylor proposes a “significance criterion”, by which persons are 
understood as creatures that attribute meanings to representations that are “peculiarly human, 
and have no analogue with animals.”14 There are certain motives behind particular actions that 
are specific and unique to humans which are not shared by animals or computers, e.g. pride, 
shame, guilt, love and honour. These motives are dependent upon the meanings that are 
significant to us. This significance is subjective and informed by our individual representations 
of the world and influenced by our culture. As Grant Gillett puts it, “the things a culture values 
are built into and structure the thinking and action of a human being.”15 This is evident from 
the fact that certain actions may be considered appropriate in one culture but shameful in 
another, e.g. killing animals for food vs. worshiping them as gods. These peculiarly human 
meanings drive us to act in ways that are distinct from how non-humans act (e.g. according to 
a programme in the case of machines, or by weighing up desires, as is proposed in animals) 
and so can act as the distinction between person and non-person. To convey the distinctiveness 
of human meanings, Taylor describes the difference between a fear response and a shame 
response. With fear, there is objective danger or badness. However, with shame, the badness 
comes from the very meanings we attribute to the particular shameful action; there is no 
objective badness. However, it is not clear if this theory truly clears up problem cases. Several 
examples from popular culture depict non-human beings with artificial intelligence who have 
complex moral thoughts and emotions and as a result exhibit these very ‘peculiarly human 
behaviours’. Perhaps Taylor would in fact allow that on his account these beings would be 
considered as persons. Furthermore, it might be argued that his theory excludes infants, humans 
with severe mental impairments or those who have somehow lost the ability to engage in the 
relevant types of meaningful behaviours. Taylor attempts to address this concern through the 
following remark: “those who through some accident or misfortune are deprived of the ability 
to exercise these capacities [required for personhood] are still understood as belonging to the 
species defined by this potentiality.”16 It seems that beings with some potential for these 
morally significant behaviours are extended the same kind of moral consideration.  
                                                 
 
14 Taylor, Charles. Human Agency and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. p97-114 
15 Gillett, Grant “Is There Anything Wrong with Hitler These Days?” 1997, cited in Elliott, Carl. A Philosophical 
Disease: Bioethics, Culture and Identity. New York: Routledge, 1999. P162 
16 Taylor, Charles. Human Agency and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. p97-114 
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 Gradient theory 
The theories discussed so far describe personhood as something that is ‘all or nothing’, i.e. you 
can be a person or a non-person. It may be possible to consider personhood as a matter of 
degree - as a gradient rather than a binary switch. Throughout our lives, we acquire more 
complex cognitive functions e.g. complex reasoning and communication abilities, and we also 
develop more nuanced ‘peculiarly human’ motives for our actions through culturally 
significant interactions. Simply put, as we grow and develop, we begin to fulfil more of the 
criteria specified in the theories above. It seems sensible that if the acquisition of these qualities 
is progressive, then personhood is also something that could be developed in gradual degrees. 
It is difficult by any measure to pinpoint a precise moment in a person’s life where personhood 
starts,17 and thinking of personhood as a gradient alleviates the need to draw this line. This 
approach may also fit with the fact that unimpaired adults have assigned more moral 
responsibility and freedom to make decisions about their own lives compared to infants and 
people with severe disabilities. However, this conclusion is problematic in practical 
application, as considering personhood this way appears to open the possibility of classifying 
some groups as ‘lesser persons’, such as infants and people with severe disabilities, who are 
still extended the same moral consideration as unimpaired adults.  
 Limitations of personhood tests 
In most attempts to formulate an account of personhood, there is an implicit assumption that 
the basic problem can be resolved theoretically. In other words, the theories described above 
are expected to generate as a sort of ‘personhood test’, where there is a set of criteria which, if 
met by a being, would mean that being should be included in the moral community as a person. 
Under such theories, if we settle on a straight definition of ‘person’, we should know what to 
do in the problem cases such as foetuses, anencephalics and ‘brain-dead’ patients. However, 
this basic assumption has been challenged by some ethicists and philosophers, who argue that 
the problem of personhood is not a problem that can be answered in abstract, non-moral terms, 
because a conception of personhood will inevitably reflect pre-existing and pre-theoretical 
moral commitments. As contemporary bioethicist Carl Elliot describes: 
                                                 
 
17 Unless this is done dogmatically (i.e. arbitrarily), as the Catholic Church does – but even then there is much 
disagreement on when this precise beginning should occur. 
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But what is wrong here is the notion that we can somehow define what a person 
is apart from our moral attitudes towards persons, and that once we get the 
definition right, this will tell us what our moral attitudes should be. … But this 
is not the way our moral grammar works. In fact, just the opposite. Our moral 
attitudes are not grounded by a theory of persons; they are built into our 
language. Part of what we mean by the word ‘person’ entails a certain moral 
attitude. A ‘person’ is a type of being about whom we have certain moral 
attitudes and towards whom we ought to behave in certain ways.18 
The implication here is that instead of arguing over what persons are capable of doing, we 
should instead examine our moral attitudes towards persons and see if they extend to these 
problem cases. This perspective would partly explain why there is not unified agreement on 
what is and is not a person, and why these debates seem to be so intractable. Different parties 
carry different moral attitudes based on what is significant to them. Elliot’s views are 
substantially influenced by Wittgenstein’s radical reframing of how to approach philosophical 
problems.  
 Social constructivist theory 
Extending on Elliot’s views, another Wittgenstenian philosopher and bioethicist, Hilde 
Lindemann, remarks that personhood may extend beyond the weighty moral arguments about 
that status of beings and could instead be about normal every-day interactions: 
[Personhood] includes taking for granted that persons wear clothes and are 
given names rather than numbers, or that they are to be referred to as ‘who’ 
instead of ‘what.’ The stance we take toward persons is one we learn, and we 
learn it so early and so thoroughly that it seems perfectly natural to us.19 
For Lindemann, recognising someone as a person is not about passing a judgement about them 
and then ascribing them certain moral rights and holding them to certain moral responsibilities; 
it is rather that through our normal every-day interactions with them, we come to treat them as 
a person. In this way, we grant others personhood by socially constructing them as someone. 
Furthermore, it is possible to socially construct a being as a person through these natural 
everyday actions, even if they are unable, or no longer able, to take part in morally significant 
behaviours. To illustrate, Lindemann describes her sister Carla, who had hydrocephalus and 
died very young. Though Carla lacked significant cognitive functions required to fulfil the 
                                                 
 
18 Elliott, Carl. A Philosophical Disease, p158-162 
19 Nelson, Hilde Lindemann. "What Child Is This?" The Hastings Center Report 32, no. 6 (2002): 29. 
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criteria of any personhood test, she was nonetheless treated as a person by her family. 
However, this is not to say that one may successfully socially construct anything at all as a 
person. If someone treats a cat like a person, that does not make the cat a person. Lindemann 
tries to explain the difference in terms of ‘sentience’ and ‘humanness’, and she relates these 
concepts to Wittgenstein’s remark that “the human body is the best picture of the human 
soul.” Sentience, she maintains, involves bodily expression of our inner psychological states 
and others’ responses to those expressions. Similarly, humanness is a requirement under the 
notion that we are only able to appropriately understand beings that are similarly embodied 
as we are. Therefore, if a being is able to successfully express their inner thoughts and have 
these interpreted by others, then through these interactions, they may be constructed as a 
person. 
 Summary 
In this overview of personhood, I have described several different theories which aim to explore 
what we mean by the term ‘person’ and how to approach some challenging cases. Some 
theorists maintain that personhood can be simplified down to a test or criterion, and conclude 
that whether or not this test is passed will indicate that the being in question bears all the moral 
rights and responsibilities that go with personhood. Other theorists argue that these views miss 
the point of personhood, which is about the moral treatment of beings by others. From this they 
argue that the concept of personhood cannot be defined independently of a particular moral 
standpoint. These issues are relevant to dementia because people with dementia (particularly 
advanced dementia) often lose the capacities specified in several theories as necessary to 
personhood (e.g. they become minimally communicative and heavily dependent upon others). 
Though my main focus will be on personal identity, I will briefly revisit these issues of 
personhood in Chapter Four, and consider them in the light of the argument about identity that 
will have been discussed.  
 Personal identity 
Personal identity, in contrast to personhood, is about the who rather than the what. It concerns 
the things that make me ‘uniquely myself’ and not someone else. While we tend to have a 
strong intuitive sense that we are the same being continuing throughout time, i.e. that we remain 
ourselves over the course of our lives, it is also clear that we can change substantially during 
that time. This seems to present a kind of paradox: how is it that I can be both the same person 
and not the same person I was, say, ten years ago? In this section, I will describe three broad 
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approaches of considering personal identity which aim to explain this paradox. The first of 
these are ‘object-based theories’ which argue that personal identity endures throughout time 
because there is some enduring substance that contains it, whether it be the body, brain, mind 
or consciousness.20 The second approach is the use of a ‘no self theory’, which rejects the 
notion that we have a persistent personal identity and that our selves persist through time. The 
final approach I will describe uses ‘agency-based theories’, which regard personal identity as 
something that is expressed and formed in our actions and the reasons behind those actions, 
and hold that we remain the same person over the course of time through the intentional 
continuity of our actions and interactions with others. The important distinction here is between 
object-based and agency-based theories, which conceive of identity in fundamentally different 
ways. This distinction is vital to understand the arguments I make in Chapter Four for the use 
of an agency-based approach over an object-based approach in the context of dementia.  
Personal identity is an important concept as it is foundational to ethical concepts such as 
obligation and accountability. If a friend of mine loans me some money, I am obligated to 
return that money to them at a later date. Implicit in this arrangement is the assumption that I 
will still be the same person when it is time to repay the debt. If I was somehow not the same 
person that the friend loaned money to, then I would have no obligation to pay them back. 
Likewise, if I organise to go out to dinner with a group of friends at a particular time and place, 
I expect those particular friends to show up at that time and place and not an entirely different 
group of people. Generally, we hold people in the present accountable for their promises and 
actions made in the past exactly because we believe that they will continue to be persons they 
are. 
Before discussing theories of personal identity, I will make some general remarks about the 
nature of the problem they are supposed to address. There is often a similarity drawn between 
the identity of objects and the identity of persons. Objects can be described as having 
‘qualitative identities’ and a ‘numerical identity’. ‘Qualitative identity’ refers to the properties 
of an object which distinguish it from other objects. For example, a carrot cake and a chocolate 
                                                 
 
20 Note that what I am describing as ‘object’ theories could be referred to as ‘substance’, or ‘entity’ theories. I 
prefer ‘object’ for several reasons. Firstly, because it reflects the empiricist conception that generally accompanies 
such theories (i.e. the presumption – perhaps only implicit – that what is being described could be identified in 
experience). Secondly, in epistemology and ontology the term ‘object’ is often contrasted with ‘subject’, and this 
distinction broadly aligns with the distinction I will make between ‘object theories’ and ‘agency theories’. Thirdly, 
the term ‘substance’ has a broad application, and in ontology can refer to a range of key ontological concepts 
(including ‘essence’ and ‘nature’), whereas ‘object’ is more focused.  
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cake are qualitatively similar in the way that they both possess the properties of cakes (sweet 
taste, eaten as dessert, baked in an oven etc.), but they are qualitatively distinct in the way that 
they have a different flavour and are made from different ingredients. ‘Numerical identity’ 
refers to total qualitative identity, the kind an object can share only with itself. While two 
banana cakes may share many or all of the same qualitative properties, they are not the same 
cake. Whatever else they may share, they necessarily occupy different spaces, and are 
composed of different ingredients (however similar those ingredients may be). Personal 
identity most often refers to the unique numerical identity of a person, over the course of their 
life. It is felt as the sense of ‘self’ we intuitively carry through all the changes in our lives.21 
Like objects, persons can be described by their unique qualities which distinguish them from 
other persons but are also only numerically identical to themselves. However, over the course 
of time, objects and persons can change their qualitative properties and thus their qualitative 
identity. The challenge here is explaining how the qualitative properties of an object, or person, 
can change over time while numerical or personal identity must, by definition, endure.  
An example often used to illustrate this problem is “The Ship of Theseus” (or one of its many 
variants).22 In the illustration we are asked to imagine that the ship leaves port from Athens and 
sails around the world, during which it encounters many dangerous storms. As a result, planks 
of wood that make up the ship are periodically replaced by new planks. This process proceeds 
until when the ship returns to Athens it no longer has any planks of wood that it originally had 
when it left Athens. And so the question arises: “is this the same ship that left?” As the changes 
are gradual it is not clear when, if ever, the ship stops being the ship that left Athens. If we hold 
that the ship that returns is not the same ship that left, then it seems that the identity of the ship 
is dependent upon its constituent parts. This might suggest that the ship ceases to be the same 
ship when it has its first plank replaced. On the other hand, if we hold that the returning ship is 
indeed the same ship that left, it follows that the ship’s identity is constituted by something 
other than an organised structure of wooden planks. Thomas Hobbes further explores this 
puzzle by asking what would happen if each of the planks that was discarded were somehow 
                                                 
 
21 Throughout this thesis I will use the terms ‘personal identity’ and ‘self’ somewhat interchangeably. 
22 Another famous variant of this is “my grandfather’s axe” which over the course of generational inheritance has 
both its blade and handle replaced several times. This sort of problem can also be extended to the identity of clubs, 
organisations or nations. For example, rock bands that have periodic roster changes until the current line-up is 
completely different from the original e.g. Little River Band. 
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collected and used to reassemble a ship.23 Would the reassembled ship be “the Ship of Theseus” 
or would it be the ship that is periodically repaired? Could they both somehow be the same 
ship? These questions are not easy to answer when regarding objects and matters are 
complicated further when we begin to consider the identities of persons, which seems to be 
more complex than that of objects. 
 Object-based theories 
As the Ship of Theseus problem illustrates, there is a least some intuitive connection (which 
may turn out to be false) between identity and objects. In first considering the puzzle, we tend 
to suppose that the ship of Theseus is the ‘actual ship’ discernible to our senses. The question 
that the puzzle then poses is precisely which parts of the ship are necessary for this 
identification to be correct. Several accounts of personal identity carry this assumption, in that 
they seek to explain personal identity as inhering in some object or collection of objects. The 
first of these are bodily identity theories.  
Bodily identity theories attempt to explain the persistence of personal identity in terms of 
continuity of a body. In other words, the idea is that we persist over time because we occupy 
the same physical body. In several ways this seems credible. It appears evident that we never 
leave the physical confines of our body and when, for example, we invite someone out for 
dinner, we expect their body to turn up. However, similar to the Ship of Theseus, it is the case 
that many cells in our body are degraded replaced by new cells through a process of growth 
and repair, and all of the changes involved in these processes are small and gradual. This, 
however, is not a perfect parallel, as when the cells in our body are replaced it is done so by 
that very organism, as a growing ‘whole’.24 The Ship of Theseus does not self-produce the 
planks that replace the old ones. We could perhaps say that the ship is repaired according to a 
particular form, much like our bodies are. However, while this seems an important observation, 
it does not entirely resolve the problem. There is still a question about how much, or what 
aspects, of a given form needs to remain the same for the thing to remain what it is. It is 
evidently possible for people to lose parts of their bodies and still remain themselves. For 
example, a person who uses an artificial limb following amputation, or a person who undergoes 
an organ transplant. We will tend to say that such procedures change people, but we are not 
                                                 
 
23 Hobbes, Thomas. Elements of Philosophy: The First Section, concerning Body. London, 1656. Chapter 11 
24 Furthermore, many other cells types in our body are never replaced and some damage cannot be repaired.  
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likely to say they become new people (or hybrid persons). This is a point that Descartes 
emphasised in formulating his now infamous mind-body distinction. There is, he observed, a 
‘great difference between the mind and the body … the body is by its very nature always 
divisible, while the mind is utterly indivisible’. Because of this difference, ‘if a foot or arm or 
any other part of the body is cut off, nothing has thereby been taken away from the mind’.25 
While we may wish to argue with the claim that ‘any’ part of the body can be ‘cut off’ without 
taking away from the mind (neurological damage seems to demonstrate otherwise), these 
observations do isolate a key problem that a theory of identity needs to address, viz. why 
changes in the body do not necessarily associate with changes in the mind. Moreover, they 
reflect a strong sense that what we think of as ‘the person’ is more closely identified with the 
‘mind’ than with the body. Given that bodies can grow and change without affecting who the 
person is, it seems that personal identity must be about something other than the continuity of 
a bodily substance. 
While Descartes’ mind-body dualism has now been widely rejected, the link he draws between 
the self and the mind has in many respects persisted. In place of bodily identity, various theories 
maintain that identity is grounded in continuity of a mental substance, or some psychological 
phenomena. Some versions of these theories conceive the mind as made of a non-physical 
substance that is somehow separate from the body (just as Descartes did). Others view the mind 
as ‘contained’ or ‘subsisting’ within the body (generally in the brain), but hold that the mind is 
in principle ‘separable’ from the body, similar to the way that a computer programme is 
separable to the hardware through which it operates. Several of these theories will explore 
hypothetical situations in which one’s mind is somehow transported into the body of another, 
in order to test where we intuitively identify a person with bodily or psychological continuity. 
For example, philosopher Bernard Williams has formulated a thought experiment in which two 
people, A and B, appear to exchange bodies. After the exchange the body of person A now 
bears the mental life of person B, and vice versa.26 Before this process occurred, person A was 
told that after the exchange, one of the people is to be rewarded and the other tortured and is 
                                                 
 
25 Descartes, René, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. p 59. 
26 Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen. The Self and the Future. London: Cambridge University Press, 1973. There 
are also many simplistic versions of this problem in popular media. Indeed, it has become a well-used premise in 
many comedy films, which turn on the difficulty in appreciating person’s perspective e.g. Turnabout (1940), 18 
Again! (1988), Dating The Enemy (1996), Freaky Friday (2003), 17 Again (2009), The Change-Up (2011), etc. 
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given the option of deciding which outcome each body receives. Proponents of psychological 
continuity would argue that person A would want person B’s body to receive the reward after 
the exchange process, whereas proponents of bodily continuity would argue the opposite.  
Rather than aligning one’s position with either the mind or body theorists, one might reject the 
question altogether, and maintain that thought experiments like the one just outlined are 
implausible. It seems inescapable that our minds are intertwined with our bodies, i.e. that the 
two purported substances are not in fact separable. The perceptions of our mind are derived 
from sensory stimuli delivered by sensory organs within our bodies and our minds take shape 
according to the sensory organs available to us. For example, having functional eyes allows us 
to imagine pictures, but someone born blind does not have access to these visual 
representations. Conversely, mental sensations drive our bodies to certain tasks e.g. desire for 
food prompting one to open the fridge. For these reasons, it seems impractical to suggest the 
transposition of one’s self based on the separation of one’s mind from their body. Thus, the 
person is not either the body or the mind; both must exist together for the person to be who 
they are. Nevertheless, the question of which parts of the combined body and mind comprise 
the person still needs to be answered. 
 Memory theory 
John Locke’s theory of personal identity is an earlier and influential version of the 
‘psychological continuity’ approach. Just as he viewed personhood as dependent on a particular 
form of consciousness, he also viewed personal identity as dependent on the continuation of a 
particular individual consciousness. In contrast to Descartes, he argued that one can hold this 
view and remain agnostic about whether consciousness (i.e. the mind) exists in the body or as 
a distinct substance. Critical to his account of personal identity is the idea that an individual’s 
consciousness can be ‘extended backwards’ to ‘past actions or thoughts’:  
as far as [a person’s] consciousness can be extended backwards to any past 
action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self 
now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects 
on it, that that action was done.27  
                                                 
 
27 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, b2, c27, paragraph 10 
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It is possible to debate what Locke meant in his notion of consciousness extending backwards,28 
but the standard interpretation, perhaps first formulated by Thomas Reid, is that this is a 
reference to the operation of memory.  
Now, consciousness of what is past can only mean remembering it; so that 
Locke’s principle must be that identity consists in remembering, and 
consequently a man must lose his personal identity with regard to everything he 
forgets. 29 
In other words, the claim is that we persist throughout time because our consciousness persists 
and connects us to our past actions through our memories. It follows that without memory a 
person could not exist. This ‘memory theory’ has endured for three centuries now, and it 
reflects the commonplace view held by many people today. These people include contemporary 
neuroscientists such as Daniel Schacter, who describes that “our sense of ourselves depends 
crucially on the subjective experience of remembering our pasts.”30 While this approach may 
seem to circumvent the problems associated with substance dualism, new problems arise with 
Locke’s memory theory, many of which relate to the pervading but mistaken view that memory 
is a reliable ‘archive’ of information. 
According to the memory theory of identity, a person’s identity consists entirely in what they 
can remember and as Reid noted, if a person cannot remember something, then it follows that 
it is not part of who they are. Locke writes:  
for, whatsoever any substance has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, 
and by my consciousness make my own thought and action, it will no more 
belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought 
or done by any other immaterial being anywhere existing.31 
There are some obvious problems with this. Firstly, there are important parts of our identity 
that memory does not capture. People usually have no memories of their early infancy, yet 
likely consider their infant self to be continuous with their present self. Similarly, there are 
some events for which we are not conscious, and so are unable to remember e.g. anything that 
                                                 
 
28 See Schechtman, Marya. The Constitution of Selves. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996. p27  
29 Reid, Thomas, and Derek R. Brookes. Thomas Reid, an Inquiry into the Human Mind: On the Principles of 
Common Sense. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. p9 
30 Schacter, Daniel L. Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the past. New York, NY: BasicBooks, 
1996. cited in Hydén, Lars-Christer, Hilde Lindemann, and Jens Brockmeier. Beyond Loss: Dementia, Identity, 
Personhood. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Chapter 5, Questions of meaning 
31 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, b2, c27, paragraph 24 
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happens to you while you are asleep. Yet, these events are still considered to be happening to 
the same person as the conscious self; we generally consider things that happen to us when we 
are asleep as indeed happening to us. We are likely concerned for the beings we are in infancy 
or when asleep in the same way that we are concerned for our present selves. Furthermore, 
sometimes we forget things that we did, yet they are still our actions. This is reflected in the 
fact that, in most cases, we are held accountable for actions even if we do not remember taking 
them. If Locke’s theory were correct, then it seems that if he were to accept an invitation to 
come to dinner with you and then later forgot to attend, he would feel no remorse, and indeed 
would argue that he cannot be the same person that you invited. This would be a very strange 
position to maintain, and it contradicts many of the ways we think about identity and 
accountability. Suppose again that a number of other friends who also received invitations 
could attest to the fact that you had invited Locke. It seems on Locke’s view their testimony 
would count for nothing. Of course, if Locke had forgotten then this may constitute an 
explanation of why he did not attend, but it would remain the case that he had forgotten a 
promise that he had made. As such, he may be asked to account for his forgetting, rather than 
the failure to show up; the point is that he is still himself and he is held accountable. Similarly, 
consider a person who committed a crime and was sentenced to imprisonment based on 
sufficient evidence. Suppose that on the way to prison this person suffered a head trauma and 
could no longer remember the crime, nor the court proceedings following it. This would not 
make the crime any less theirs. However, under a Lockean view this person would have to be 
acquitted of their crimes. 
Secondly, it is common for people to remember things incorrectly as memory is also mutable 
and suggestible in addition to being inconsistent. We can become convinced that things 
happened when they did not, and can be made to feel differently about past events through the 
use of leading questions and re-negotiation. Indeed, these false memories can affect people’s 
actions in significant ways and has caused considerable controversy in cases of eye-witness 
testimony, which have later been revealed to be incorrect based on DNA evidence.32 Under a 
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of memory and existence of implantable false memories. See Loftus, Elizabeth F. "Leading Questions and the 
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22 
 
memory theory of personal identity, the existence of false and mutable memories suggests that 
our personal identities would be unstable or even fictitious.  
These arguments suggest that while memory is an important factor in determining our actions, 
in many cases it does not behave as a stable archive of information and also fails to capture 
several important parts of our identity. In the following chapter, I will explore the nature of 
memory in more detail, as it is the cognitive function most commonly affected by dementia. 
 No-self theories  
An alternative way of addressing the problem of personal identity is to conclude that the notion 
of a persistent self is in fact an illusion. An early proponent of this view is classical empiricist 
philosopher David Hume, who reported that when he looked for the self in his experience he 
could not find it: there was no object in his field of perception to which this idea could be 
applied. He concluded that what we regard as our ‘self’ is simply a bundle of perceptions; a 
collection of ‘impressions’ that exist in the mind like a play in a theatre. The bundle that is 
present at one time could be very different from the bundles at earlier or later times, and so 
there is no real basis to speak of a persisting identity.  
Expanding on Hume’s thinking, contemporary philosopher Derek Parfit calls for a shift of 
focus away from identity (which is an all or none quality) towards relation and survival.33 Like 
Hume, Parfit argues that there is no one self that endures throughout all of life, but rather a 
myriad of past and future ‘selves’ comprised of variable degrees of psychological 
connectedness in the operation of a particular mind. This notion of psychological 
connectedness differs from the notion of psychological continuity described previously in two 
important ways. The first is that psychological connectedness comes in degrees as opposed to 
continuity, which is binary. That is to say, an individual could be psychologically connected to 
a recent part self to a greater degree than a distant past self. The second is that psychological 
connectedness it is not transitive while continuity is transitive. This means that while a ‘person’ 
at time Y may be psychologically connected to both a person at time X and a person at time Z, 
the persons at time X and time Z need not be connected. If all these ‘people’ at time X, Y and 
Z are psychologically continuous, then under a theory of psychological continuity, they must 
be the same person. Parfit encourages us to focus more on the degree of connection there is 
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between to past and future selves, rather than being concerned about whether they are the same. 
On Hume and Parfit’s accounts, persistence is a non-issue because they abandon the notion of 
anything persisting.  
While Hume and Parfits view may be theoretically simple, the implications are far-reaching 
and likely unacceptable to most people’s functional understanding of personal identity. As 
Marya Schechtman describes, “[t]here is a strong pre-philosophical sense that facts about 
identity underlie facts about four basic features of personal existence: survival, moral 
responsibility, self-interested concern, and compensation.”34 To abandon a notion of a 
persistent personal identity, as no-self theories appear to do, is to undermine these four features, 
which seem an unacceptable conclusion for a coherent life and society. As such, I will not 
return to these theories in my discussions in Chapter Four. To utilise a no-self theory when 
considering the problematic cases in dementia would be to short-sightedly dismiss them as 
completely unproblematic. 
 Agency-based theories 
The approaches to personal identity discussed so far, including the no-self view, largely turn 
on the idea that personal identity (if it exists) consists in some object or ‘thing’ that persists. In 
the Lockean view it is the persistence of certain ideas contained in one continuous 
consciousness, whereas for Hume it is expected to be the persistence of some entity discernible 
in experience (in the same way that other objects, like trees, dog, buildings, bodies, and so on 
persist in experience). Another approach is to view personal identity as grounded in the 
persisting activity that generates experience, i.e. in agency. On this view, we are who we are – 
or perhaps become who we are – through what we do and the reasons we act upon. So, on this 
approach, the ontology of a ‘person’ is not conceived in terms of a bounded object persisting 
in space and through time, but rather as an agent: an entity that expresses its nature through 
action (or more precisely, through the actualisation of power).  
Immanuel Kant formulated a version of this approach when he argued that for experience to be 
possible, there must exist a unified mind that brings together and interprets the ‘raw material’ 
given by our perceptions.35 He then extended this work in his moral philosophy, by arguing 
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that the unified self operates in the world through intentional action, and ultimately through 
acting on what he called the ‘moral law’ (which he held to be given through pure reason, and 
not experience).36 Though few now accept Kant’s radical separation of ‘pure’ universal reason 
and experience, the link he draws between intentional action and personal identity has been 
widely implicated in modern theories of identity. An influential contemporary exponent of the 
idea is Christine Korsgaard. She argues that the self-reflective structure of human 
consciousness requires us to form a conception of ourselves, out of which we select reasons as 
the basis of our actions.37 This self-conception is established and developed through the 
ongoing process of self-reflection and decision. In this way, says Korsgaard, personal identity 
is self-constituted. The persistence of an identity, on this view, depends not on physiological 
or psychological continuity, but is achieved through the person’s ongoing commitment to a 
particular set of reasons and corresponding patterns of activity – what one might call moral 
continuity.  
In Korsgaard’s theory, the processes of reflection and deliberation are arranged around our 
ideas about what is important, i.e. our values. When we act on a given reason we are implicitly 
acknowledging that that reason represents something significant to us.38 This means that values 
have a central place in her conception of identity. A critical question that follows from this is 
how our values are identified and determined, or, in other words, what is it that brings us to act 
on some reasons and not others. I will not attempt a complete response to this question here, 
but will outline three perspectives that have a particular relevance to our view of dementia.  
The first is from the legal and moral philosopher Ronald Dworkin. Unlike Korsgaard, Dworkin 
does not directly attribute his views to Kant, but his ideas seem in many respects to fit with the 
Kantian tradition. He maintains that a person’s core, identity determining values are associated 
with what he calls the person’s ‘critical interests’.39 Critical interests are things that people 
consider vitally important to their sense of self and what makes their lives ‘successful as a 
whole’. He contrasts them with ‘experiential interests’, which are interests worth meeting for 
the fulfilment of pleasure and happiness but are not vital to one’s sense of self. For instance, a 
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person might choose to stay up late to finish an assignment, and thereby spurn the experiential 
interests of a good night’s sleep, in order to satisfy the critical interest of getting a good grade 
at university and thereby improve future job aspirations. Our commitment to certain 
relationships is often similar. For example, many parents will attest that the price of parenthood 
is high when it comes to satisfying experiential interests; parents will often put their own 
interests aside in order to provide better lives for their children. Dworkin suggest that this is 
because being a parent is a core element of their identity. He further notes that these ‘critical 
interests’ tend to be reasonably stable throughout someone’s life, whereas experiential interests 
more easily come and go. Importantly, Dworkin holds that critical interests are formed from 
rational reflection on what makes one’s life worth living.40 
Dworkin’s account of critical interests has been challenged by psychiatrist Agnieszka 
Jaworska. She accepts the basic notion that there are some values that are ‘identity defining’ 
and others which are not, but rejects Dworkin’s claims that identity determining interests can 
only be formed and upheld through a rational appraisal of one’s life as a whole. Instead, she 
argues that such interests can be identified through the sense of obligation that a person attaches 
to such interests, the impact they have on that person’s sense of self-respect, and connection 
that these interests have to something independent of the person’s experience. In other words, 
for Jaworska, a person is expressing critical interests when they hold themselves obliged to act 
on a particular reason that is not solely about themselves, and where successfully or 
unsuccessfully acting on that reason affects their self-respect. An important implication of this 
view is that the persistence of autonomous agency is not dependent on those rational capacities 
that enable a person to reflect on their life as a whole, and so a person may retain the ability to 
express their identity in mild to moderate dementia. 
The third perspective that I wish to outline involves the role of relationships in forming our 
personal identities. The theories mentioned thus far generally present personal identity as 
something that is contained within the person. However, these views may ignore the fact that 
humans exist in relationships with the world and other people. Relational accounts of identity 
argue that a person’s identity is constituted in their interactions with other persons, places and 
things. This idea fits with the observations that many people will regard a sense of belonging 
to a place or community to be critical to their sense of self. This can range from being a citizen 
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of a nation, a member of a particular family, or a person who has lived and worked in a certain 
area. Some people consider connections to particular geographical structures to be vital to their 
identity. This kind of thinking is evident in Māori culture in New Zealand, where the traditional 
introduction (mihimihi) includes a person’s relationships with a river, a mountain and a tribe, 
all before the person’s name. Others consider particular objects to be critical to their identity 
for example if someone takes extreme pride in their car, they might claim that this car 
constitutes a significant part of who they are. Furthermore, the objects we own, clothes we 
wear and things that we surround ourselves with in our homes can also be considered 
constitutive of our identities.  
It is worth noting that a relational account of identity does not easily fit with an object theory, 
as it is not obvious what it would mean to say that an object (e.g. a collection of memories) 
was constituted by existing in relation to other objects. There is a much better fit with agency-
based accounts, as it makes sense to think of a person’s agencies as enabled or supported by 
other ‘agencies’ (whether it is the regular operation of an environment, or the understanding 
and help given in a family).  
An aspect of relational theory that needs special consideration is the role of society in 
‘constructing’ a person’s identity. Theorists who emphasize this aspect may be said to be 
putting forward a ‘social-constructivist’ account of identity. Hilde Lindemann, for example, 
defines personal identity as “the interaction of a person’s self-conception with how others 
conceive her: identities are the understandings we have of ourselves and others.” 41 This view 
argues that a person’s identity is held partly in other peoples’ conception of them, instead of 
purely within the person themselves. Obviously the relationships we have to others are 
complex, and vary in degrees of significance. It follows that the relationships we consider more 
important contribute to our identity to a greater degree. Our conceptions of other people are 
based on many factors, and are in certain respects mutually determined, but to a large degree 
are derived from a person’s actions.42 If someone acts in a way that does not fit with my 
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conception of who they are, I am forced to adjust my conception. For example, if someone who 
I had always thought was a nasty person does something kind for me, I am forced to at least 
consider that my notion that they are a nasty person is wrong. Similarly, our conceptions of 
others can affect their actions. Most people will feel social pressure to alter their actions in 
order to conform to the expectations held by others e.g. if a person is treated as a soldier – they 
are given orders by a superior and are expected to wear a military uniform – they will be 
inclined to act as a soldier. This interaction between actions and conception of others is the 
basis for ‘social roles’. These can include, but are not limited to, someone’s occupation and 
their role in a family or social group. On this view, a person’s identity is constructed by their 
actions, by the language that is applied to them, in their thoughts, and also in the thoughts of 
others. This person persists as the same person through time not only because they consistently 
act as themselves, but also because others consider them as the same person through time and 
hold them to the expectation that they act ‘as themselves’. An implication of this view is that a 
person will have only limited control over their identity. This is evident in the influence that 
early learning and experiences have on who a person later becomes. When babies are first born, 
we tell stories about them and so construct who they are, while the babies themselves have very 
little control over this; at this stage their identity consists mostly of third person accounts.43 As 
we grow older, we begin to take more ownership over our actions and contribute more to our 
identities, while the second and third person factors are still pertinent to our identity.  
 Summary 
In this section, I have outlined how personal identity has been variously explained in terms of 
bodily continuity, psychological continuity, as an illusion, and as grounded in agency. The last 
of these approaches the concept of personal identity in a fundamentally different way from the 
previous theories, in that it conceives identity as being expressed in actions and choices, rather 
than as a persistent object. The differences in these approaches can impact our understanding 
of dementia and its effect on personal identity. A clear example of this is the link that is 
commonly drawn between memory and identity, and the loss of self that is associated with 
dementia. As suggested earlier, this ‘commonsense’ thinking indicates the widespread 
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influence of the Lockean view that the self persists through the extension of consciousness via 
memory. I have also indicated how agency may be linked to our values and how there are 
different perspectives on how identity-defining values are formed, which will become 
important for the discussions in Chapter Four where I will re-examine the cases described in 
the introduction. 
 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have described several classical and contemporary theories exploring the 
concepts of personhood and personal identity. In light of Locke’s pervasive theory, which holds 
that memory is the object of a person’s identity, in the next chapter I will more closely examine 
what exactly ‘memory’ is and describe how the traditional archival model of memory is being 
superseded. In Chapter Three I will provide some informative descriptions of dementia, to 
provide context to the ethical problems. In Chapter Four, I will revisit several of the theories 
outlined in this chapter and discuss how they fit with the emerging view of memory and a 
clinical context of dementia. I will argue that agency-based theories provide the best framework 
for understanding how dementia affects identity and for addressing the kinds of ethical 




Chapter Two – Memory 
We know much about human memory. Yet as it is with memory itself, we do 
not know very much for sure. And, what is more, we only have a vague idea 
about memory as a whole. We cannot even say if there is such a thing as memory 
(or a memory, or specific memory systems) at all, and I am afraid that the view 
of memory that I put forward will intensify this doubt.44 
Memory, as a concept, has long referred to a collection of measurable cognitive processes 
involved in storing information in an archival fashion in an individual’s brain. This view of 
memory has been pervasive and unchallenged in multiple disciplines involved in ‘memory 
studies’ (including psychology, neuroscience, social sciences, history and many others) for 
hundreds of years. It has been accepted by mainstream western society because it corresponds 
with many intuitive, well-engrained assumptions and is reinforced by comfortable metaphors 
that place memory as something akin to a stone tablet, history book or computer hard drive. 
However, only very recently, this definition of memory as an archive and its associated 
assumptions are dissolving under a weight of new thinking across research disciplines.  
Our understanding of memory is relevant to my broader question about the relationship 
between identity and dementia for two reasons. Firstly, memory is integral to several of the 
philosophical theories of personal identity described in the previous chapter and is indeed the 
central feature of John Locke’s pervasive memory theory. These theories have been based on 
an archival model of memory and so an analysis of that model and whatever might replace it 
is needed as we consider how they apply to dementia. Secondly, memory deficits are key in 
the diagnosis and experience of people with dementia. In fact, dementias are often defined as 
‘memory disorders’, so an understanding of the basic assumptions of this model will also help 
in elucidating some of the clinical and ethical problems that accompany dementia.  
In this chapter I will briefly outline the change in understanding that is occurring in memory 
studies. I will first explain what the archival model involves and then discuss some of the 
limitations with it. As I do this, I will indicate the new understanding that is emerging. 
Throughout this chapter I will draw heavily on work by Jens Brockmeier and the PhD thesis 
of Ian O’Loughlin.  
2.1 Memory as an archive 
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The archival model describes memory as a distinct process of the brain that stores information 
of past events for future retrieval. This model is also sometimes called a storage or 
computational model, but all of these names are variations of the same basic structural process 
and have similar downfalls. In this section I will reiterate the three main features of this model 
as identified by Ian O’Loughlin in his PhD. 45 These features are: (1) that memory is divided 
into several memory systems or different ways of remembering, (2) the tripartite model of the 
remembering process (encoding, storage, retrieval) and (3) the existence of a memory trace, or 
engram. In the next section, I will explain how this model is currently dissolving. 
2.1.1 Memory systems 
Memory theorists have long divided memory into different memory systems divided by the 
kind of information that is remembered and the cognitive (and supposedly neural) processes 
that are employed in order to remember that information. These distinctions have undergone a 
multitude of iterations, although the systems detailed below have arrived at somewhat of a 
settled framework in many research disciplines investigating memory as well as mainstream 
accounts. 
The first distinction that O’Loughlin describes is between declarative and non-declarative 
memory. Declarative memories are those that are easily expressed verbally. This type of 
memory is further divided into semantic memory (the memory of facts, e.g. the date of 
someone’s birthday) and episodic memory (the memory of past events, e.g. what happened at 
that person’s birthday party last year). In contrast, non-declarative memory is primarily 
expressed non-verbally and does not easily lend itself to verbal expression. Non-declarative 
memory is the memory of skills, competences or procedures, e.g. how to play the guitar, 
perform CPR, conduct one’s self at a funeral, and perhaps the ability to understand the meaning 
of the word ‘birthday’). This type of memory is more commonly referred to as procedural 
memory. While these classifications of memory systems may seem distinct enough in most 
cases, there is clear overlap in their actual expression. For example, how someone behaves at 
a funeral (procedural memory) depends on their previous experience with funerals (episodic 
memory) and their understanding of what a funeral is (semantic memory). Autobiographical 
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memory is typically regarded as a combination of episodic and semantic memories of an 
individual’s past.46 
A second distinction that O’Loughlin mentions is between working memory (aka short-term) 
and long-term memory. Working memory is concerned with holding and manipulating several 
pieces of information at the same time and is employed in problem solving tasks. Long-term 
memory involves the storage of memories for extended periods of time and is employed to 
answer fact-based questions.47 These systems are theorised to involves separate but related 
neural processes in the brain. The way these systems overlap with the declarative and non-
declarative memory is controversial and ambiguous.  
2.1.2 Encoding, Storage and Retrieval 
Under the archival model, memory researchers have traditionally identified three stages 
involved in memory which are present across memory systems. These stages are: encoding (the 
stage where the present event, skill or fact is encoded into the brain as a memory ‘trace’), 
storage (the stage where this encoded memory trace lies dormant for some time) and retrieval 
(the stage where this memory trace is reactivated and the event, skill or fact is reproduced). 
While modern accounts have added nuance to this process, attempting to describe some of the 
more dynamic features of human memory, many do not deviate from the basic assumption that 
memory works via this three-step process. Metaphors that describe human memory as a 
computer hard drive (or some similar metaphors such as a filing cabinet or notebook, etc.) have 
helped to reinforce this tripartite model and establish it as a strong foundation in all disciplines 
of memory research and mainstream accounts. In fact, several memory problems are often 
categorised as problems with one of these stages and neuroscientists have long been looking 
for neural and chemical bases for memory traces and patterns of brain physiology associated 
with encoding and retrieval processes.  
2.1.3 Engrams and memory traces 
An engram, or memory trace, is the object of memory processes viz. it is what is supposedly 
encoded, stored and retrieved. As we are aiming to describe memory, it is unacceptably circular 
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to use the term ‘memory’ as what is encoded, stored or retrieved and so the term ‘memory 
trace’ or ‘engram’ is substituted. A popular definition of these terms comes from Endel 
Tulving, who describes memory traces as the sum of physical changes that result from an event 
which is necessary to remember that event at a later time.48 Some theorists describe engrams 
as neural while others will describe them as cognitive, and often these terms are used 
indiscriminately or the link between them is not detailed. A theory of a neural engram is the 
hypothetical ‘grandmother cell’. This is the idea that there are specific neurons that respond to 
specific stimuli and are reactivated when we remember that stimulus. The historical example 
from Jerry Lettvin in 1969 gave the theory its name as the example he used was the visual 
representation of a grandmother’s face.49 Believing in the existence of grandmother cells fits 
with the idea that memory disorders could destroy the very cells holding someone’s 
representations of their grandmother, and so render them unable to remember or recognise her. 
Nevertheless, an engram is most commonly thought of as the physical manifestation of a 
memory – it is what is encoded, then lies dormant and retrieved at a later time.  
2.2 Criticism of archival memory 
In this section, I will detail several shifts away from the archival model of memory across 
memory research disciplines by drawing on work written by Jens Brockmeier. In his 2010 
publication, Brockmeier describes how the archival model of memory that has been pervasive 
in “Western common sense, both in everyday life, and in science” from ancient through to 
recent times, is now being dismantled by new ideas and evidence from multiple areas of 
memory research.50 Brockmeier uses the phrase ‘memory crisis’ to refer to these changes in 
thinking, which have been developing since the early 1990s. He then reviews some of these 
changes from different disciplines under the headings of: social and cultural, media and 
technology, literary and art, and biological and neurocognitive.  
2.2.1 Social and Cultural 
The first area Brockmeier describes is the social and cultural field of research, which include 
various studies of history and social sciences. Brockmeier describes how societies and nations 
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have several strategies to reshape the relationship between the past and the present. Typically, 
these groups will come to regard some events as ‘in the past’ and no longer important, while 
holding others as ‘still alive’ and relevant. These strategies are processes of collaboratively 
renegotiating inter-subjective meaning constructions of the past for particular purposes. This 
renegotiation of meanings is especially evident in large events that affect many people in the 
world – events sometimes referred to as ‘cultural memories’. However, the analysis can be 
extended to autobiographical memories and indeed any type of remembering.  
Firstly, memories of an event are subjective. Different people will remember the same event in 
different ways because a single event can be experienced, perceived and interpreted in different 
ways. For example, first-hand experience of an event is very different to hearing about that 
same event from someone who experienced it first-hand, and different again from hearing 
about the event from someone who did not experience it first-hand. For example, the way I 
remembered the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre shortly after they occurred was very 
simplistic (i.e., as some strange but seemingly important thing that happened to some buildings 
on the other side of the world – which is an unsurprising account from a six-year-old New 
Zealander). Obviously people who experienced the attacks first hand will have a profoundly 
different memory from mine. Moreover, the subjective cultural context that an event fits into 
will greatly influence how we experience and thus remember it. A six-year old American who 
experienced the attacks in a similar fashion to how I did (through television screens, as opposed 
to first hand) would still remember the event differently to me because of the profound affect 
that this event had on American culture.  
While there may be endless ways that an event may be experienced and interpreted, it does not 
follow that any interpretation could be correct. It may be that some interpretations are ‘more 
correct’ than others, and there are always certain interpretations that are obviously incorrect. 
To illustrate, imagine you are driving down the road and arrive at an area being re-worked. 
There is a road-worker holding a STOP/GO sign with the STOP side facing you. Your 
perspective of the road worker holding the STOP/GO sign is different to that of the people 
driving the opposite direction to you (and thankfully so). It is different again to that of 
pedestrians walking by, not taking much notice of the road-works. However, it would be 
incorrect to interpret this situation as the road-worker instructing you to drive through. A person 
could mistakenly take this view, but such an interpretation would either indicate a 
misperception of the event or a failure to understand what the STOP/GO sign means. This basic 
idea that there are correct and incorrect ways of remembering events is reflected in the fact that 
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we will often ‘test’ our memories against those of others.51 That said, the extent to which a 
correct or ‘true’ account of a given event is possible will depend on the nature of the event 
being described, and the meanings involved.52  
Memories of events are often changed by how and why we remember them each time we do. 
When you experience an event you will have an in-the-moment emotional response to it. 
Shortly after that event, your recollection of it will most likely evoke a similar emotional 
response. However, when you recall the same event sometime later, your emotional response 
may be somewhat different, or you may come to revise your initial feelings in the light of more 
recent experiences, and from then on remember it in a considerably different way. For example, 
imagine having an eccentric haircut in high school; at the time it may have seemed like a great 
idea but later you may come to regret it. This kind of emotional transition can also happen in 
reverse, or other subtler ways. Regardless, it seems evident that the purpose for remembering 
an event will have significant effects on the nature of that memory. To illustrate, imagine going 
on a fishing trip with your Grandfather for hours as an 8-year-old with a very short attention 
span and not catching any fish. When recounting your fishing experience to your parents, you 
may describe the experience as boring with the purpose of not having to go fishing again. 
However, many years later after your Grandfather has long passed away, you may come to 
regard this memory in a much fonder light as a way of remembering the care and precious time 
spent with your now deceased relative. This process of re-visiting, re-evaluating and re-shaping 
memories of an event incorporates more than just emotional states and purpose for 
remembering; it involves many features of the person remembering (including updated 
knowledge and experiences) and collaboration with the experience and thoughts of other 
people remembering the same event. To return again to the example of the September 11th 
attacks, as I have grown older my memory of these has significantly matured through 
discussing it many times with others and learning their thoughts on the matter, as well as having 
a better understanding of how events like this affect the world as a whole.  
In summary, while the emerging social and cultural view of memory outlined here retains a 
critical notion of truth, it presents memories as much less stable than the archival model 
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suggests. The intersubjective and reconstructive view of memory, which has growing empirical 
support, is at odds with the archival model of encoding, storage and retrieval of stable traces 
or engrams. It also blurs the distinction of memory types, as memories of events synthesise 
episodic and semantic information together. It shows that memories are not fixed 
representations of particular experiences, or stable traces in a person’s brain that lie dormant 
and unaffected for some time. Rather, memories are meaning constructions involving ongoing 
renegotiation of the past through various cultural processes.  
2.2.2 Media, Technology and Art 
The second area Brockmeier discusses is media and technology. Here, he reinforces the 
mutable and collaborative nature of memory by describing how memories are framed and 
structured by the ways that they are exchanged and presented e.g. through television, 
photographs, books, stories, artefacts, and so on. He also describes how the increasing daily 
reliance on digital media is leading to what he terms the ‘digitalisation of memory’.  
It is clear that the ability to remember an event (or any other piece of information) can often be 
improved by the use of media. For example, when recounting a holiday from many years ago 
you may be able to recall some basic details, but when you look through photos or journal 
entries from that holiday many more details and stories will appear to come ‘rushing’ back to 
you. This is not dissimilar to how one’s ability to solve complex mathematical problems is 
enhanced through the use of tools like an abacus or calculator. While such ‘tools’ can serve to 
improve one’s ability to remember, they can also alter or modify the ways that events are 
remembered. A truly tumultuous family Christmas where two of your aunts had a long drawn 
out argument may be reinterpreted as a wonderfully happy occasion if only pleasant photos are 
taken and are latterly made into a slide show with an up-beat sound-track. Indeed, when 
viewing this slide show many years later, perhaps no one will remember that the fight even 
happened. As Brockmeier puts it, “such digitalized mementos deeply affect people’s later 
remembrance of things past. Over time they may turn into ‘true’ memories that gain more and 
more ‘documented’ authenticity.”53 
The recent shift toward ‘digitalization of memory’ further reinforces the idea that memories 
are processes of collaborative negotiation of past events. Today, the contexts in which 
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memories are being negotiated have become increasingly widespread through integration of 
online networks like social media websites. In these networks memories depicted in media are 
shared and mixed in with other peoples’ memory ‘documents’, blurring the lines between 
personal and public realms of memory. Photos, videos and stories that ‘document’ an event are 
continually remixed and edited by many collaborators as they are reimagined or customised 
for particular purposes. These actions have become so commonplace in the practice of 
remembering that perhaps we should now regard memory as a ‘mental-technical-cultural 
process.’ 
These reflections on the ways digital media are changing memory may be related to a broader 
and longstanding discussion within theories of literature and art about what constitutes a ‘true’ 
account of any feature of human life, and how different modalities influence our understanding. 
Brockmeier briefly explores this connection in a discussion of autobiographical memory and 
the role it has in forming someone’s personal identity. He describes how this role has come 
into question in modern literature and art. Several authors and artists have raised questions 
about the reliability, and indeed existence of, memory as a storage of past events. Brockmeier 
notes that these ideas arose in literature and art long before they were discussed in 
psychological research on memory.54  
2.2.3 Biological and neurocognitive 
Finally, Brockmeier sketches out the biological and neurocognitive evidence against the 
archival model of memory from scientific disciplines including molecular biology, neurology, 
psychiatry, psychology and clinical research. He notes that although there has been a paradigm 
shift away from an archival model in the disciplines of memory research already discussed, the 
realm of scientific research still clings to the traditional model, even in the face of new findings 
within these disciplines that contradict it. It seems that this recent evidence is not yet sufficient 
to disrupt the deeply ingrained assumptions about the functioning of memory. Nevertheless, 
the evidential case that has been established seems compelling. 
To begin with, Brockmeier discusses how the neurological events that occur in perception, 
memory and imagination are physiologically indistinct: 
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Now considering matters on a neurological level, we have learned that there is 
no evident distinction between brain processes operative in remembering and in 
perceiving. That is, there is no biological correlate that allows us to distinguish 
between what we traditionally call acts of remembering the past from acts of 
perceiving the present, whether in a visual, acoustical, or tactile mode. Nor are 
there any indicators that separate the content of a perception in the here and now 
from the content of a perception that we had at some point in the past. For the 
neuronal circuits involved there is no difference between perceiving, say, a face 
here and now and having perceived this face a few days or years ago… Other 
studies have shown that the same holds true for the distinction, unverifiable on 
neurological grounds, between a present perception or thought and an imagined 
future perception or thought.55 
What this means is that there is no discernible neurological difference between you imagining 
driving down a road currently being re-worked (as in the earlier illustration), and remembering 
a time when you experienced this. Similarly, if asked to remember the guests who were at a 
dinner party you attended recently, it is likely that you would imagine yourself back around 
that dinner table perceiving the other guests. These neurobiological facts about memory go 
some way in explaining many of the short-comings of the archival model. The notorious 
unreliability of memory and evidence of false memories make much more sense when we 
abandon the computational model of the archive in favour of looking at memory as a re-
imagining of past events.56  
Brockmeier argues that if the differences between these neurological processes (remembering, 
perceiving and imagining) are not biological, then they must instead be discursive and 
contextual. That is, it must be the meanings that we attribute to each process that differentiates 
them.57 A significant context for dividing these processes is temporal organisation. Memories 
are contextualised as in the past, whereas perceptions are contextualised as in the present and 
an imaginings are contextualised as possible futures. However, temporal context is not the only 
context available. Indeed, there are multitudes of cultural practices, unique to different 
societies, which give contextual relevance to things being remembered. These are often 
interwoven with everyday activities, mnemonic tools and social institutions like schools which 
significantly affect how and what information is remembered. 
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Regarding remembering as active neurological processes occurring in the present, akin to 
imagining and perceiving, fits with updated models of thinking about the brain, sometimes 
referred to as the ‘21st-century brain.’ This model is based upon neuroplasticity – continuous 
changes in the brain throughout life – in contrast to the ’20th-century brain’ that was thought to 
be reasonably stable once adulthood was reached. Brockmeier describes how every act of 
remembering fuses elements from the past, present and imagination:  
All new experiences, that is, new neuronal input, encounter neuronal networks 
that have already been shaped by previous encounters with the world. This pre-
existing ‘neuronal knowledge’ powerfully influences the way new experiences 
are integrated, shaping the content, texture, and emotional quality of what we 
‘recall’ of the moment.58 
This updated model of the ‘21st-century brain’ gives a biological basis for how our memories 
change over time and are affected by our purposes for remembering them (as described in 
section 2.2.1). Furthermore, it abandons any neurological basis for the archival model, 
disregarding the theory of ‘grandmother cells’ and also the purported process of encoding, 
storing and retrieving, as there is no neurological evidence for either. Brockmeier remarks that 
this new understanding of brain function is “the very opposite of anything resembling an 
archive” and goes on to describe it as: 
a highly fluctuating excitation pattern formed by continuously changing 
connections of nerve cells, a fickle and unreplicable circuit that in manifold 
ways is interlaced with other circuits that are also in permanent flux. Nowhere 
and at no moment in time we can identify here a spot—that is, some molecular 
or cellular processes, or neuroanatomical substrate—where something could be 
stored, preserved, and kept over time.59 
Understanding the process of remembering as a novel cognitive process, involving the re-
construction of a past event in the present moment and attribution of culture-specific meanings, 
that results in new changes within a constantly changing brain structure, provides a biological 
explanation for the mutability of memory described in the previous sub-sections. As such, 
every act of remembering an event will modify the memories of that event by mixing together 
current perceptions and new meanings with previous constructions of that event.  
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In this chapter I have summarised the work of Jens Brockmeier and Ian O’Loughlin in 
describing how the longstanding ‘archival’ model of memory is being dismantled in the 
contemporary study of memory. I have indicated why memory should instead be understood 
as a complex process of reconstructing mental connections to re-perceive an event. This 
process can involve mental, technical and cultural practices which help form and also alter 
those connections. Under this model, remembering is an active and learned technique that 
improves as it is practiced – more connections are made and you get better at making them. 
Likewise, a person’s proficiency for remembering can also be diminished through age or 
pathology if, for example, fewer new connections are made or fewer environmental prompts 
surround you. This model frames memory as something we do, i.e. as an agentive exercise. 
This helps to explain how different parties can remember the same event differently, how a 
person can remember the same event very differently at different times, and how people are 
better at remembering the things that are important to them. These features of memory will 
become important in the discussions of the various theories of identity in a dementia context, 
which will be discussed in Chapter Four. To provide context to this discussion, in the next 




Chapter Three – Dementia 
Dementia is a syndrome of many different brain diseases that involve a progressive decline in 
cognitive functioning. Like ‘identity’, it is a term used to refer to several distinct but related 
things. Although dementia predominantly affects older people (over the age of 65), it is not a 
normal process of aging and in rarer cases, it can affect younger people. In the previous chapter 
I described the archival model of memory and how this is being challenged in contemporary 
memory studies. I sketched the case for viewing remembering as an inter-subjective process 
that involves the unstable ‘reimagining’ of the past. However, much of our understanding of 
dementia is built upon an archival model of memory and is indeed supportive of it. For 
example, the finding that people with dementia (or other brain diseases) are better able to 
remember certain types of information than other types is taken as evidence for the existence 
of different ‘memory systems’ in the brain. As a result, descriptions of dementia will often use 
language from archival models. I will return to the relationship between memory, dementia and 
identity in the following chapter where I will revisit the theories of identity described in Chapter 
One and the cases described in the introduction. However, before reengaging with those 
problems it is necessary to have a working understanding of the common types of dementia, 
its societal and personal impact, and the standard clinical management. In this chapter, I will 
briefly detail some descriptive epidemiological data for dementia in New Zealand and 
worldwide, provide an overview of a typical clinical course of dementia, and then describe the 
most common dementia subtypes. 
3.1 Epidemiology of dementia 
Dementia prevalence and the associated economic burden are high and rising, both in New 
Zealand and around the world. According to reports from the WHO, it is estimated that in 2010 
there were 35.6 million people living with dementia worldwide and the total global societal 
costs of dementia were $604 billion USD. 60 This corresponds to 1.0% of the worldwide GDP. 
In 2012, Alzheimer’s New Zealand published the Economic Impact of Dementia in New 
Zealand Executive Summary which estimated prevalence statistics as well as the financial 
                                                 
 




burden of dementia in New Zealand.61 This summary reported that in 2011, there were an 
estimated 48,182 New Zealanders living with dementia (1.1% of the total population), an 18% 
increase from 2008 (40,746 in 2008).62 It also reported a projected increase to 147,359 people 
by 2050 (to over 2.6% of the population). The total financial cost of dementia in 2011 in New 
Zealand was estimated as $954.8 million, the highest contributing factor being the cost of 
residential aged care facilities.  
These large increases in projected prevalence and economic burden, in New Zealand and 
worldwide, are largely due to the aging demographic of populations in developed countries, 
but may also be partly due to inefficiencies in management. Prevalence rates are higher in 
females (60%) compared to males (40%), primarily because females tend to live longer than 
males. Dementia is also a difficult disease to measure in populations for multiple reasons due 
to its insidious onset and the limited accuracy of diagnostic tools.  
3.2 Clinical course of dementia 
All forms of dementia emerge as a result of pathological changes in the brain and present with 
changes in cognitive function. Cognitive capacities that can be affected include: memory, 
attention, orientation, comprehension, calculation, language, judgement, etc., with memory 
deficits being present in most cases. Though there are multiple different pathologies that 
contribute to these changes, most dementia subtypes are progressive and incurable63. While 
symptoms may be transient and variable from hour to hour and day to day, the overall trend of 
symptoms is one of declining cognitive function. The progressive nature of symptomology is 
commonly divided into early, middle and late stages (detailed below), but more complex 
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in New Zealand. 
63 All of the dementia subtypes described in this thesis are currently incurable and irreversible, however there 
are some conditions that are referred to as ‘reversible dementias’. Many of these conditions present with 
behavioural or cognitive symptoms similar to other dementias, but may not fulfil sufficient criteria for dementia. 
These include: depression, adverse effects of drugs, drug or alcohol abuse, space-occupying lesions, normal 
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55, 51.Suppl1 (January 2009); Philpot, Michael. "Reversible Dementias." Principles and Practice of Geriatric 
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divisions for clinical assessment and management also exist, such as the Global Deterioration 
Scale (GDS).64  
• Early: There is significant cognitive impairment that cannot be explained by normal 
aging processes. The most common symptom is memory difficulties surrounding recent 
events. Independence is mostly unhindered. 
• Middle: Cognitive capacities decline to the point of hindering independence by 
impairing individuals’ ability to complete their activities of daily life (ADLs). 
• Late: Individuals become nearly completely dependent upon caregivers, unable to feed 
themselves independently and lose most of their ability to communicate. 
In drawing an outline of the typical clinical course of dementia, it is necessary to keep in mind 
that dementia can be caused by a range of pathologies and so the clinical presentation and 
experience of those affected can differ greatly. Furthermore, the experience of dementia is 
highly intersubjective and dependent upon a myriad of psychosocial factors unique to each 
individual. That said, a typical case could take the following course: an elderly person presents 
to their primary care physician because they have noticed some ‘early warning signs of 
dementia.’ According to Alzheimer’s New Zealand, these symptoms could include difficulty 
in recalling recent events, difficulty performing regular tasks, language difficulties, 
disorientation to time and place, poor judgement, difficulty with abstract thinking, misplacing 
things, changes in mood or behaviour, changes in personality and loss of initiative.65 If 
symptoms are mild, it is likely that they would receive a diagnosis of mild cognitive impairment 
(MCI). MCI is where cognitive impairment is beyond what is expected from age and level of 
education, but does not significantly interfere with activities of daily life. This often functions 
as a pre-diagnosis syndrome for different dementia types, similar to the way prolonged adult 
hyperglycaemia, sometimes called pre-diabetes, often goes on to a diagnosis of diabetes type 
II.  
From this initial presentation, it is likely that the patient would undergo several investigations 
with their primary care physician, aiming to identify the cause of their cognitive impairment. 
This would involve identifying a dementia type as well as ruling out other diseases of old age 
that can present with a cognitive component. If the case is complicated or symptoms more 
severe, the primary care physician may refer on to a psychiatrist of old age or memory clinic 
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for more thorough investigations, as well as a needs assessment so that available supports could 
be put in place. Investigations carried out by clinicians could include:  
• Thorough medical history including: investigation of the current cognitive symptoms, 
details of previous medical conditions, family history of dementia and corroborative 
history from family members 
• Cognitive assessment: use of one of many tests designed to assess cognitive functions 
e.g. the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MOCA) which assesses memory, visuospatial 
abilities, attention, concentration, language and orientation66 
• Clinical neurological examination: physical tests within the clinic which can identify 
any particular brain lesions – includes assessment of motor and sensory functions 
• Medical neuroimaging: likely an MRI or CT scan to assist in subtyping and rule-out 
reversible conditions  
• ADL assessment: investigating the person’s capacity to independently perform their 
daily activities – serves as a needs assessment for any care supports  
• Routine blood tests to rule out treatable diseases which may be presenting with a 
cognitive component. Stroke and infections can often cause cognitive impairment in 
elderly and this can be misdiagnosed as early dementia symptoms  
• Psychological screening and mood assessment to assess the need for any mental health 
intervention. For example, depression can cause cognitive impairment.  
Following investigation, patients will schedule on-going appointments with clinicians to assess 
the progression of their dementia and receive treatments corresponding with their particular 
type of dementia. This should include a psychosocial component. Psychosocial supports will 
vary widely based on the services available and the patient’s particular needs, ranging from 
dementia support groups that share coping strategies for altered cognition, to in-depth 
counselling for the unique challenges that arise from dementia. Patients and their families will 
generally require more support as their dementia progresses as they will have increasing 
difficulty independently carrying out their ADLs. This need will often be met by close friends 
and family members taking up a greater caring role, by the implementation of home help 
services, and eventually by moving the patient into full-time residential care. Clinicians will 
counsel people with dementia through these changes and continuously assess if their current 
needs are being met. Clinicians will often be consulted for capacity assessments linked to 
specific complex and important life decisions about issues of finance, living situation and end 
of life care.  
                                                 
 




As the vast majority of dementias are currently incurable, current treatments mostly aim to 
improve management of symptoms, rather than treating underlying pathologies. As such, 
dementia is a terminal illness and the mortality rate in advanced dementia is very high.67 In 
spite of this, dementia is often not regarded as a terminal illness, and people living with 
dementia often receive burdensome non-palliative interventions such as tube feeding, 
laboratory tests, restraints and IV therapy.68 Recent research efforts have aimed to redirect 
focus in advanced dementia towards palliative care. 69 
3.3 Dementia subtypes 
Multiple different brain pathologies can result in the cognitive symptoms present in dementia. 
These different pathologies give rise to different ‘dementia subtypes’, which present with 
different symptoms and require different treatments. Alzheimer’s Disease is the most common 
pathology, present in 50-70% of cases of dementia. Other significant contributors include: 
Vascular Dementia, Lewy Body Dementia and Frontotemporal Dementia.70 Boundaries 
between these pathologies are often blurred and multiple pathologies often co-exist in the 
brains of people with dementia. In the following subsections, I will discuss current theories of 
pathophysiology, any unique symptomologies, the processes of diagnosis, and current 
management strategies for each of these major subtypes. 
3.3.1 Alzheimer’s disease (AD) 
Alzheimer’s disease is the most common type of dementia. The exact cause of the disease is 
poorly understood but several compelling theories exist based on pathological changes 
observed in the brain tissue of deceased patients with an AD diagnosis. Currently, the most 
widely accepted theory involves the gradual loss of function and death of neurons due to two 
pathological processes: extracellular build-up of β-amyloid protein forming senile plaques, and 
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distinguish them from other types of dementia. 
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intracellular accumulation of tau proteins forming neurofibrillary tangles (findings only 
identifiable in post-mortem histology).71 According to the “amyloid hypothesis”, some 
causative process results in an imbalance between production and clearance of β-amyloid 
fragments, which are formed by the breakdown of a neuronal transmembrane protein (amyloid 
precursor protein – APP) causing a build-up of toxic oligomers and insoluble fibrils of these 
fragments to form. These fragments accumulate outside neurons as insoluble plaques or as 
toxic oligomers which block neuron-neuron synapses and eventually lead to the death of 
neurons. The “tau hypothesis” involves the formation of intracellular neurofibrillary tangles 
due to the hyper-phosphorylation of tau proteins. Tau is normally an abundant, soluble protein 
involved in assembly and stability of the intracellular microtubule framework within neurons. 
When tau becomes hyperphosphorylated, it becomes insoluble and cytotoxic, disrupting the 
neuron’s intracellular transport system, displacing organelles and eventually resulting in cell 
death. These microscopically evident changes result in macroscopic brain atrophy. This 
pathology seems to firstly affect the neurons in the entorhinal cortex and hippocampus, 
primarily active in memory processing, and latterly spread to other areas of the cerebral cortex 
including the temporal and parietal lobes, as well as parts of the frontal cortex and cingulate 
gyrus. 
The most common early symptom is a noticeable memory deficit in recalling recent events. As 
the disease develops, memory problems become more pronounced and other cognitive 
capacities can be affected including: perception, execution of movements and language 
difficulties. It appears that not all memory systems are equally affected: in the early stage of 
AD, episodic memory of events from the distant past, semantic memory and procedural 
memory appear to be mostly spared when compared to recall of recent events. However, as the 
disease progresses through to the moderate stage, other memory systems can also become 
impaired. At this stage, unexpected behaviours can begin to manifest, e.g. wandering, 
unprompted agitation/aggression/crying, increased confusion, etc. People with late stage AD 
become completely dependent upon caregivers in order to carry out their ADLs and their 
language capabilities are often reduced to a few simple phrases or are sometimes completely 
absent. 
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Diagnosis of AD is based upon medical history and exclusion of other causes. A definitive 
diagnosis can only be made from post-mortem histology. Medical imaging can be supportive 
of this diagnosis as brain atrophy can be observed, however it is not sufficient for diagnosis as 
the extent of atrophy is highly variable in different cases and it is also unlikely that patients 
have historical scans for comparison. 
Pharmacological treatment for AD is of limited benefit and management has a strong 
psychosocial emphasis. Most medications for AD are acetylcholinesterase inhibitors e.g. 
donepezil, which prevent the degradation of acetylcholine (ACh), the most common central 
nervous system neurotransmitter. ACh has the effect of increasing the concentration and 
duration of action of the neurotransmitter within synapses. This causes some improvement in 
cognition and behaviour, however, it does not slow the progression of the disease as it only 
treats the symptoms and does not affect the underlying pathology.  
3.3.2 Vascular dementia (VaD) 
Vascular dementia, also known as multiple infarct dementia, is the second most common cause 
of dementia, contributing to between 20% and 50% of cases. VaD often co-occurs with 
Alzheimer’s disease.72 It involves progressive decline in cognitive function due to a series of 
cerebrovascular events, i.e. multiple minor strokes causing hypoxic damage to brain tissue. 
Symptomology is similar to AD (involving memory impairment sufficient to interfere with 
daily life) but may also have specific neurological signs dependent upon the particular location 
of the vascular damage, i.e. patients may have specific motor or sensory deficits corresponding 
to certain areas of brain damage. Progressive decline occurs due to multiple small injuries, 
while abrupt decline can be caused by a specific severe injury. Diagnosis requires a temporal 
relationship between cerebrovascular injury (which can be identified through medical imaging) 
and cognitive deficits. Like in AD, treatment is largely psychosocial with modest alleviation 
of symptoms from acetylcholinesterase inhibitors but should include medications that reduce 
stroke risk such as anticoagulants, antihypertensives, antiarrhythmics, and antihyperlipidemics.  
3.3.3 Dementia with Lewy Bodies (DLB) 
Dementia with Lewy Bodies contributes to 10-15% of dementias and is defined by the presence 
of Lewy bodies (a post-mortem histological feature seen in affected neurons) and often 
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characterised by fluctuating cognition, motor symptoms of Parkinson’s disease and recurrent 
visual hallucinations.73 Lewy bodies are collections of alpha-synuclein and ubiquitin proteins 
that aggregate within the cytoplasm of neurons. In DLB, Lewy bodies develop in both 
cholinergic cortical neurons and dopaminergic neurons of the substantia nigra (within the 
brainstem). This results in Parkinson’s-like motor deficits in addition to the cognitive deficits 
present with other dementias.74 Like vascular dementia, DLB can co-occur with AD where 
both histological findings will be present on autopsy. Because the symptoms of DLB overlap 
with both AD and Parkinson’s disease it is often misdiagnosed as one or the other. However, 
while AD has a slow insidious onset, DLB often has a rapid and acute onset within the first 
few months, and as just mentioned, includes the development of motor deficits. Motor 
symptoms are managed by the same medications used to treat Parkinson’s (levodopa), while 
cognitive symptoms are sometimes improved by medications for Alzheimer’s (donepezil) 
which act to increase the synaptic concentration of deficient neurotransmitters. Like in 
Parkinson’s disease, DLB makes patients hypersensitive to antipsychotic medications which 
supress the dopamine pathway, such as haloperidol and can result in “neuroleptic malignant 
syndrome,” a life-threatening disorder characterised by muscle rigidity, fever, and autonomic 
instability. 
3.3.4 Frontotemporal dementia (FTD) 
FTD is the most common clinical presentation of frontotemporal lobar degeneration (FTLD), 
which comprises a range of pathological processes involving loss of neurons in the frontal and 
temporal lobes of the cerebral cortex. FTD has an earlier onset than other types of dementia, 
affecting people most commonly between the ages of 55 and 65, where other forms of dementia 
are most common in those older than 65. There are several variants of FTLD, which correspond 
with different versions of FTD, the most common being behavioural variant FTD (bvFTD) as 
it involves significant changes in behaviour. These behavioural symptoms could include: 
disinhibition, apathy, loss of empathy, compulsive behaviours, hyperorality, perseveration, 
aggression and inappropriate sexual behaviours. All these symptoms have dramatic 
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consequences for social functioning. There are also less common clinical presentations for 
FTLD, including speech difficulties without significant changes to behaviour. These are 
described as progressive non-fluent aphasia (PNFA), involving difficulty in speech production, 
and semantic dementia (SD), involving loss of word meaning, impaired naming and 
comprehension. The clinical presentation is related to the distribution of pathology in the 
frontal and temporal lobes and as the disease progresses, these symptomologies may overlap. 
While the symptoms of FTD include significant behaviour changes and language impairments, 
other cognitive functions that are commonly affected by other dementia types remain 
unaffected, such as memory, perception, spatial awareness and motor function. 
A range of different pathologies contribute to FTLD. 40% of FTLD cases involve a pathology 
of tau proteins and are classified as FTLD-tau pathologies. As explained earlier, Tau is a protein 
associated with microtubule stabilisation, and several mutations can lead to the build-up of 
toxic tau aggregates that inhibit neuronal function.75 The majority of tau-negative cases involve 
pathological post-translational modifications of TAR DNA-binding protein (TDP-43). This 
protein is involved in multiple DNA and RNA processes within neurons and becomes non-
functional when hyper-phosphorylated, ubiquitinated and cleaved. Mutations in the gene that 
codes for this protein are present not only in cases of FTLD, but also cases of amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis (ALS). Most cases of FTLD which are negative for both tau and TDP-43 have 
been identified as having FUS pathology (FTLD-FUS). FUS is similar to TDP-43, as it is a 
DNA and RNA binding protein and is also pathological in some cases of ALS. A minority of 
cases do not fit into any of the above classifications and these are termed FTLD with no 
inclusions (FTLD-ni). However, as diagnostic techniques develop, these cases are becoming 
re-classified.76 
Progression of FTD is gradual and insidious, making diagnosis difficult, but this is usually 
done by taking into account a full history as well as being supported by medical imaging and 
neuropsychological testing. Management focuses on supporting the patient, their family and 
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caregivers to adjust to the behavioural changes but can include some pharmacological 
treatments, such as SSRIs, which may be helpful in alleviating some behavioural symptoms.77 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined a typical clinical course of dementia and described different 
types of dementia. Each of these types has some unique pathophysiology, symptomology and 
management, although, it appears that there is a clear distinction between the experience of 
people with FTD and those with non-FTD types. Nonetheless, all types of dementia profoundly 
affect peoples’ lives by the progressive impairment of cognition in correlation with 
pathological processes in the brain. This direct cognitive impairment, however, is only one 
cause of suffering in dementia; there are many other indirect effects of dementia that can be 
similarly profound. These include how people with dementia uniquely respond to their adjusted 
set of cognitive skills and also how other people respond to them now that they have dementia. 
Dementia is a complex disease that affects persons, rather than just brains. In the next chapter 
I will discuss these indirect effects in more detail, and relate them and the other effects of 
dementias described here to the theories of identity discussed in Chapter One. As I do this, I 
will indicate how the different theoretical approaches might inform our responses to the kinds 
of ethical problems described at the beginning of this thesis. 
                                                 
 
77 Cardarelli, Roberto, Andrew Kertesz, and Janice A. Knebl. "Frontotemporal Dementia: A Review for Primary 
Care Physicians." Am Fam Physician, 2010 Dec 1;82(11):1372-7. 
50 
 
Chapter 4 – Dementia, Memory and Identity 
This thesis aims to develop an account of how identity is affected by the changes that come 
with various forms of dementia, and to use this account to outline a response to some of the 
identity-related ethical problems that arise in caring for people with dementia. In the previous 
three chapters I have discussed the topics of identity, memory and dementia individually. In 
this chapter I will bring these topics together in an integrated response to the ethical problems 
I described in the introduction to this thesis. In this response, I will argue for a shift away from 
object-based theories, in favour of agency-based theories.  
Before going further, it is worth reviewing the key ethical problems relating to dementia and 
identity. Problems of identity in dementia can arise in various ways. In one set of cases, there 
is uncertainty about what it means to respect a person’s autonomy. These problems become 
clinically salient when considering the practical implications of past and present decisions 
about treatment. The ‘Margo’ case presented by Dworkin78, in which it is unclear whether or 
not an advanced directive refusing treatment should be applied, is an example of this kind of 
problem. Underlying this question is uncertainty about what makes Margo who she is and what 
it means for her to make an autonomous (i.e. ‘self’ determined) decision. In this chapter I will 
discuss the limitations of an object-based account and the advantages of an agency-based 
account of identity. In brief, object theories focus too much on the direct, non-modifiable, 
neuropathological effects of dementia and ignore the indirect, modifiable, psychosocial factors 
of dementia. They also do not fit with the process model of memory. Although an agency 
approach does not eliminate all the difficulties associated with dementia, it allows us to take 
proper account of the complex array of direct and indirect effects dementia can have on a 
person’s identity and as a result offers more optimistic conclusions regarding the persistence 
of personal identity through dementia. 
A more radical kind of problem is the suggestion that a person’s identity can be significantly 
changed by dementia. Family members might express this concern when they describe the 
person with dementia as ‘no longer themselves’. This problem typically arises when people 
with more advanced dementia, or frontotemporal dementia (FTD), behave in grossly 
uncharacteristic ways. An illustrative case is Mr D79. I will again argue that these problems are 
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poorly explained by object theories, especially Locke’s memory theory, and that an agency 
approach is much more suitable. In non-FTD dementia types, such changes can often be 
explained by an in depth appraisal and understanding of the person’s unique situation and 
difficulties associated with their dementia, meaning that they do not reflect a radical change in 
personal identity. However, it must be acknowledged that there are cases (particularly with 
people with FTD) where it is difficult to explain the behavioural changes in this way as they 
seem to be directly caused by the dementia pathology. Nevertheless, while these cases do 
present a substantial threat to personal identity, I will argue that we should understand them 
not as indicating a radical change in identity, but rather that the person’s capacity as an agent 
has been significantly impaired, and as such they are less able to hold themselves together as 
themselves.  
The possibility of a person’s identity being impaired, such that they cannot act ‘as themselves’, 
links to a third kind of problem concerning the relationship between identity and dementia: the 
question of whether personhood can be lost altogether. This problem generally relates to later-
stage dementia. Though this problem is not the central focus of this thesis, the concepts of 
personhood and personal identity are intertwined, and so what is said about one necessarily 
affects what is said about the other. I will briefly address personhood directly in section 4.4 
after discussing personal identity. I will argue that this problem likely arises due to accounts of 
personhood that favour ‘personhood tests’, and suggest that we may better engage with people 
in late stage dementia if we instead adopt an agency-based, socially constructivist account of 
personhood.  
4.1 Direct and indirect effects 
Apparent changes in identity for a person with dementia can be attributed to a complex blend 
of factors. Throughout this chapter, I will refer to non-modifiable, neuropathological effects 
that dementia has on personal identity as ‘direct effects’, and the modifiable, psychosocial 
effects as ‘indirect effects’. Though this distinction does blur at certain points, it is useful in 
helping us to delineate two kinds of causes generating apparent changes in identity. In general, 
indirect effects tend to involve complex changes in the social and physical environment of the 
person with dementia, independent of their cognitive impairment, while direct effects can be 
causally linked to the person’s dementia pathology.80 To illustrate, imagine a person becomes 
                                                 
 
80 The distinction I am making here is similar to the difference between ‘medical’ and ‘social’ models of disability. 
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incontinent as a result of their dementia pathology. Their incontinence is an example of what I 
am calling a direct effect. It is non-modifiable and causally linked to their brain pathology. 
However, the way that others respond to that person’s incontinence, and the changes that these 
responses bring, would be examples of what I am calling indirect effects. For instance, if the 
person with dementia is scorned and demeaned for their incontinence, this would likely 
increase their social anxiety and negatively affect their sense of self-worth. Alternatively, if 
those around them take on a supportive and caring stance, and regard the incontinence as a 
small challenge to overcome, the person’s anxiety may be reduced and their sense of self-worth 
maintained. While we have little control over direct effects, we can modulate them indirectly 
through our responses. This explains the huge variation in the subjective experiences of 
dementia and also how different families of people with cognitive impairment can interpret 
similar situations differently. Maria Medved highlights this point in her chapter in Beyond 
Loss, when she describes how families of people with neurodegeneration and neurotrauma can 
help to support or deconstruct that person’s identity through the “co-narration” of events in 
their lives.81 She compares two interview cases of families where one of the family’s members 
is affected by either dementia or a traumatic brain injury. The interview focused on a particular 
event: a time where the family member affected by dementia/TBI went to a shopping mall 
alone, got lost and then returned home several hours later. This event was negotiated as a 
positive sign of recovery or as a negative symptom of the illness by different members of both 
families. Medved argues that the way a family narrates these everyday events bears much more 
significance on the affected person's identity than any cognitive impairments caused by their 
disease.  
4.2  Arguments against an object approach 
Many traditional explanations of the persistence of personal identity rely on the persistence of 
a particular object. In this section, I will revisit three examples of this kind of approach – 
theories of bodily continuity, psychological continuity and Locke’s memory theory – and 
outline how they relate to the ideas discussed in chapters two and three.  
4.2.1 Bodily continuity 
                                                 
 
4 Lindeman et al., Beyond Loss, Chapter Six: Everyday Dramas. 
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The first theory I described in Chapter One is ‘bodily continuity theory’. In this theory 
persistence of a person’s identity is understood through the persistence of that person’s body. 
As discussed in Chapter One, a key problem with this theory is that it seems evident that 
personal identity persists through significant growth and modification of our bodies. It is 
obvious that changes in the body occur through growth and repair, and through the aging 
process. Simply identifying the person with the body says nothing about what changes in the 
body might substantially affect identity. If we are to meaningfully understand identity in bodily 
terms, it is necessary to specify in which part(s) of the body identity is constituted, and what 
form these need to have in order for the person to be the person they are. In regard to dementia, 
it should be noted that memory is not significantly implicated in this model, unless it is 
understood in strictly physical terms. This is in fact exactly what neuroscientific forms of the 
archival memory model describe: a purported existence of ‘memory traces’ stored in the brain 
which are vulnerable to the deletion due to the pathological damage in dementia. There is an 
obvious parallel here with the Lockean memory theory of personal identity, which I will discuss 
shortly. 
If we apply the bodily continuity theory to the kinds of ethical problems that have been 
described, all apparent losses or changes in personal identity must be attributed to physical 
changes in the body. From this position, one might reject the idea that personal identity can be 
affected by dementia in any significant way, as the body of the person is largely unaffected (the 
person’s body is at least still recognisably the same). Of course, this again raises the question 
of which part of the body is most important in determining identity. Consequently, this simple 
answer reveals nothing about how difficult cases like those described should be resolved. It 
says nothing, for instance, about how we should decide whether or not Margo’s advance 
directive should be applied. 
Despite these limitations, it must be acknowledged that the apparent changes in identity 
associated with brain disease provide some evidence that identity is in some way associated 
with the brain. As first glance, this may point to a simple and bleak solution to the problems. 
If the personality disturbances are solely caused by dementia pathology and we have no 
curative treatments, then we have no control over the personality changes and there is nothing 
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we can do to stop it.82 However, given the ways that the effects of dementia are psychologically 
and environmentally modifiable (as discussed in Chapter Three), it seems evident that this view 
is at best incomplete. Attributing the identity problems entirely to the pathological changes in 
the brain disregards any ways that identity can be indirectly affected in dementia. While direct 
effects undoubtedly play a significant part in the emergence of the identity problems, attending 
to psychosocial factors involved in dementia either intensify or alleviate the suffering of people 
with dementia and this cannot be explained solely in terms of brain pathology. In the words of 
Thomas Kitwood, "it is inept to consider 'the problem' of dementia as lying exclusively within 
the individual who carries the neurological impairment,"83 and this approach does just that. A 
theory of identity suitable for people with dementia must be able to account for both the direct 
effects caused by the pathological process of dementia and the indirect effects caused by 
changes in the interactive social environment surrounding the person with dementia that are 
not directly related to their cognitive impairment.  
4.2.2 Psychological continuity 
Psychological continuity theories of identity come in various forms. The classic dualist account 
locates identity in the continuity of some notion of mental substance, ontologically distinct 
from bodily substance. As argued in Chapter One, the radical separation of mind and body 
seems unsustainable as it runs almost completely contrary to modern cognitive neuroscience. 
Moreover, as just noted, the effects of dementia evidently reveal an important connection 
between identity and the brain. This connection would be difficult to explain if our personal 
identities were wholly dependent upon some non-physical substance of the mind. From this 
standpoint, we would be required either to suppose the changes to be caused by some non-
physical pathologies that affect the person’s mind, or attribute them entirely to the indirect 
effects of dementia that the bodily continuity theory ignores. It seems much more plausible to 
conclude that psychological processes are in some respect dependent on physical processes, 
and that a combination of direct and indirect effects is responsible for dementia symptoms. 
Hence, to explain these symptoms and the ethical problems they generate we require a theory 
of identity that can incorporate both.  
                                                 
 
82 Some could argue that this may be a positive conclusion in some circumstances e.g. if someone’s behaviour 
changed to become very distasteful, they can chalk it up simply to the dementia and not worry that this is what 
the person was really like under a polite visage. 
83 Kitwood, T. M. Dementia Reconsidered: The Person Comes First. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997. 
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However, not all psychological continuity theories involve a dualistic ontology. One might 
hold that mental objects operate through physical processes, and yet still hold that identity is 
constituted in the persistent set of such mental objects. The key point would be that these 
identity-constituting objects are only recognisable as such when described in their mental 
aspect (i.e. as they are to the subject). John Locke’s memory theory of identity is an example 
of this kind of approach.  
4.2.3 Locke’s memory theory 
Locke’s memory theory of identity is one of the most prevalent versions of psychological 
continuity. It holds that the persistence of personal identity relies on the person retaining certain 
autobiographical memories (a person’s ability to “extend their consciousness” back to their 
past actions), but seeks to bypass the ontological issues related to substance dualism by placing 
focus on memories as a phenomenological fact of conscience experience, independent of 
specific substance. The conception of memory traditionally deployed in this theory is archival. 
Indeed, despite the problems that I will describe shortly, the combination of an archival model 
of memory with Locke’s theory of identity has endured for some time, and at a surface level 
seems compelling. Dementia is often referred to as a ‘memory disorder’ and our definitions of 
common dementias are intertwined with our understanding of memory. In Chapter Three, I 
noted that many descriptions of memory disorders including dementia use archival language, 
being described as problems with either encoding, storing or retrieving memories. Accordingly, 
dementia is popularly imagined as a disease that ‘deletes’ or destroys stored memories. This 
commonplace language is essentially archival, imagining dementia as damaging the very 
neurons where memories are stored. If Locke’s memory theory of personal identity is combined 
with an archival model of memory, it seems obvious that dementia can damage someone’s 
personal identity. In other words, if someone’s personal identity depends upon the persistence 
of archival memories and these memories are destroyed by a pathological process, then it seems 
reasonable that their personal identity is also destroyed. The widespread acceptance of these 
theories is perhaps why the ethical problems associated with dementia are so pervasive. 
However, this view becomes much less credible when we consider the significant parts of a 
person’s identity that are not captured by memory and the flaws inherent in archival model of 
memory. 
Although Locke’s theory attempts to bypass the metaphysical problems that accompany 
dualism, it still presents identity as reliant on the persistence of certain ‘psychological’ objects, 
viz. ‘memories’. Thus, it ultimately suffers from the same problems as the other object theories, 
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in being unable to account for any aspect of identity that does not inhere in the relevant object. 
As bodily continuity ignores mental aspects of identity and psychological continuity ignores 
physical aspects, memory theory fails to capture important aspects of our lives that we have no 
memory of. As discussed in Chapter One, this would include our early infancy and when we 
are asleep. It also fails to explain why important aspects of our identities concern 
intersubjective relationships, including social roles and pre-determined dispositions/traits. 
Moreover, it dissociates us from any actions that we forget, which is an indefensible position 
when considering any reasonable account of obligation or accountability. Applied to the ethical 
problems associated with dementia, Locke’s theory limits the scope of the personal identity 
problems to within an individual’s memory deficits. Furthermore, it does not address the 
second kind of personal identity problem, in which changes in identity are associated with 
uncharacteristic behaviour. Frontotemporal dementia profoundly affects behaviour and mostly 
spares memory, and so arguments about memory are irrelevant in explaining how identity is 
affected in these cases. 
The problems just described are in direct response to Locke’s claim that identity consists in 
memories. If we abandon the archival model of memory, as discussed in Chapter Two, then 
further problems come to light. In the emerging understanding of memory, the purported 
objects that Locke’s theory bases identity on (memories) are not in fact objects (or even 
‘traces’) stored in the mind or the brain. Rather, remembering is a process of re-imagining past 
events in collaboration with others which is neurologically similar to perception or imagination. 
By contrast, when we relate this new process model of memory to the experiences of those 
with dementia, we find a remarkable fit. As described in Chapter Three, the cognitive 
impairment caused by dementia is transient in nature. A person with dementia might struggle 
to describe a past event at one time and have no difficulty doing so at another time. People with 
dementia are much more successful when their ‘remembering’ is assisted by other people, and 
when they use mnemonic tools.84 If the archival model was correct, and memories were like 
‘files’ kept in the brain, vulnerable to ‘deletion’ by dementia-type diseases, then the fluctuating 
ability of people with dementia to remember specific events is difficult to explain. However, if 
                                                 
 
84 This is not specific to people with dementia – all people become more successful at remembering with help of 
other people and strategies to remember. 
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we adopt the view that remembering is an intersubjective process, then it is no surprise to find 
that people can sometimes struggle to remember and that they perform better with assistance.  
It seems that we must look elsewhere for a helpful way of exploring these personal identity 
challenges in dementia. In the next section I will explain how agency theories succeed where 
object theories fail, in accounting for both direct and indirect effects of dementia.  
4.3 Arguments for an agency approach 
Where object-based theories conceive a person’s identity as existing as the same persisting 
object (or perhaps set of objects), agency-based theories conceive persons fundamentally as 
agents and their identities as formed by and expressed in the decisions they make ‘as 
themselves’. A contemporary proponent of an agency-based approach is neo-Kantian 
philosopher Christine Korsgaard. According to Korsgaard, a person becomes and remains ‘who 
they are’ by establishing and maintaining a rational coherence to their actions. I will briefly 
outline how she arrives at this view here. 
Through the course of our lives, we face many situations that require decisions. In making 
decisions we must select a reason as the basis of our action. Our ability to articulate the reasons 
underpinning our actions will vary, but in so far they are intentional (i.e. the result of a 
decision), there will be a reason (or reasons) behind the action. This is evident in several ways. 
For example, when making a decision we typically go through a process of ‘thinking through’ 
the situation, i.e. identifying possible reasons. In every area of human interaction there is an 
expectation that people should be able to explain their action, i.e. provide reasons for why they 
do what they do. Again, the extent to which we can do this varies, but the basic expectation is 
there, and if a person had no ability to do this we would question their ability to act 
autonomously, i.e. as themselves.  
Korgaard argues that when choosing which reasons we will act upon, we apply a conception 
of ourselves and the values that we regard as important. This conception is partly based on the 
values that others have instructed us in and the descriptions that have been applied to us, and 
in part on the decisions we have made before and the reasons that we have personally resolved 
to act upon.85 On this view, who you are is a result of the interaction of your ‘given’ (or 
‘natural’) psychological and biological propensities, the community that has raised you, and 
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then ultimately what you decide to do in the situations you find yourself in. Korsgaard’s 
account focuses on the deliberative processes internal to the individual. In Chapter One I 
mentioned other agency-based theories which emphasise other ways our actions are formed. 
For instance, relational theorists present a person’s identity as constituted within their 
relationships with objects, environments and other people. Similarly, social constructivist 
theorists conceive identity as determined by a person’s self-conception and the conceptions 
that others hold of that individual. Despite these differences in emphasis, the various 
approaches all agree in holding that a person is fundamentally an agent, i.e. a being whose 
existence must be understood through their abilities to act in ways that are distinct to that 
individual.  
When applied to the questions of identity that arise in dementia, an agency-based approach 
attends to the ways that the person’s capacities are impaired, and seeks to understand these in 
relation to the overarching value structure that gives coherence and continuity to the person’s 
life (rather than focusing discretely on the damage or disruption that has occurred in the body 
or mind). In other words, these approaches examine how a person’s ability to act ‘as 
themselves’ is affected, both directly by the various forms of cognitive impairments and also 
indirectly by the ways that their family and society has responded to those changes.  
While other models tend to ignore either direct or indirect effects, agency models can explain 
both direct and indirect effects of dementia on identity. In particular, having noted that a 
person’s capacity to act is affected by their relationships with others, certain indirect effects of 
dementia on identity become evident. If dementia undermines a person’s ability to maintain 
relationships with significant people in their life, or prevents them from accessing certain 
environments they are familiar with, this could damage their identity. Being required to live in 
an unfamiliar place, no longer surrounded by the objects and environments that constitute one’s 
identity, a person would naturally be unsure of how they should act, and whether the values 
they regard as important will be accessible. They would feel, as it were, not ‘at home’, which 
is to say, not free to ‘be themselves’. For example, if maintaining a healthy garden was 
considered an important activity to a person, such that they took great pride in the status of 
their garden, being forced to move into a residential care facility where they are unable to care 
for their own garden would be significant blow to their identity (even if they still possess the 
capability to tend to a garden). In some cases, modifications to the relationships or environment 
might be possible that restore a person’s ability to enact who they are (or to feel ‘at home’ in 
their surroundings). However, if, for example, a person’s dementia progresses to the point 
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where they have lost all ability to recognise family members they have been close to, then on 
an agency-based account one is forced to conclude that this part of the person is gone. 
Another important indirect effect to consider is undue disabling of people with dementia by 
misinterpreting peculiar actions as signs of dementia, when they are actually rational and 
reasonable responses to their unique situation. Steven Sabat describes this idea his chapter in 
Beyond Loss86. He describes the importance of appreciating a person’s social context in 
understanding their actions and warns against attributing peculiar behaviours simply to 
dementia. When we do not have an understanding of a person's social context, actions can be 
interpreted as abnormal or pathological when in fact it is completely appropriate given the 
person's true situation. Sabat provides the example of Dr. B, a retired professor with AD whose 
ability to focus in on one conversation in a busy room is diminished. When put in this situation, 
he covered his ears and wept. While at first glance this peculiar behaviour could be interpreted 
as evidence of the progression of this man’s dementia, another interpretation emerges when we 
appreciate his particular situation. If we have prior knowledge of Dr B’s direct impairment 
(difficulty focusing when surrounded by multiple stimuli), then his behaviour becomes much 
more reasonable. Dr B’s intentions and goal forming were coherent (wanting to focus on a 
particular conversation), he was unable to execute these intentions and so he reacted 
appropriately to the frustration. His actions were meaning-driven and appropriate given his 
situation and were reasonable responses to his direct impairment. An accurate understanding 
of the direct effects caused by a person’s dementia avoids unnecessary indirect impairments 
involving misattribution of peculiar behaviours to dementia. 
The distinction between direct and indirect effects can be further developed through the social 
constructivist approach to identity, which highlights the ways that our agency is socially and 
interpersonally determined. In dementia, people find their roles still important and yet can lose 
their roles through direct and indirect means. In the same chapter, Sabat describes the idea of 
a "personal present" from historic psychologist William Stern. This is essentially the idea that 
it is possible to bring to our present identity any part of our lives, past or future that we consider 
relevant. Sabat describes a participant in one of his interview studies, who when introduced by 
the phrase "Mr. K was a lawyer-", interjected with "I am a lawyer!" Mr. K was not delusional 
                                                 
 




about no longer practicing as a lawyer, but it was important for him that his accomplishments 
were acknowledged and recognised as still relevant. Though no longer able to practice law due 
to his cognitive impairment (a direct effect), the significance of this can be modulated by 
continuing to treat him with the same deference and respect as you would a practicing lawyer 
(an indirect effect).  
There are several complex indirect effects involving role changes within family structures. A 
common example is when one person in a couple gets dementia and their partner takes on the 
role of the primary carer. The role changes involved here can have significant effects on a 
person’s identity. For example, increased carer stress can have detrimental effects on their role 
as partner or spouse. Similarly, children of people with dementia sometimes describe a loss in 
their parent’s identity due to them no longer acting in ways that fit with that role. Taking a 
social constructivist approach to identity, it follows that when people close to a person with 
dementia relate to them differently, the identity of that person is affected.  
Another important way in which identity can be socially constructed is through the stigma 
associated with dementia and the attribution of new negative roles. When a person receives a 
diagnosis of dementia, people around them often treat them differently, and (often 
unintentionally) assign them a new role as a ‘dementia sufferer’. This new ‘role’ conceives 
(‘constructs’) the person as dependent or incapable, and consequently denies them the 
opportunity to do things they are in fact able to do. In this way, the social construction of the 
person effectively disables the person by preconception, over and above whatever actual 
physical or cognitive impairment they have. Kitwood refers to these kinds of disabling 
responses as part of the “malignant social psychology” that surrounds dementia.87 However, it 
is not necessarily as malicious as this sounds: often family members of those with dementia 
are responding as best they can to particularly unusual and stressful situations and are trying to 
protect their loved ones from harm. To illustrate, imagine a person with dementia accidentally 
burns herself in the kitchen, when for many years she was a proficient cook. Her family may 
take this as a sign that she is no longer able to safely cook for herself and so might stop her 
from doing so. This may seem like a relatively banal example, but consider if this person 
regarded the activity of cooking for her family as vital to her role as a mother. Being prevented 
                                                 
 




from cooking would therefore threaten her identity as a mother. Furthermore, this kind of 
disabling behaviour is usually not isolated to single functions; people with dementia may be 
gradually but increasingly viewed as incapable of completing multitudes of tasks, not just 
cooking, and these small things can often build up. Instead, if people with dementia are 
regarded as valued members of the family (or social group) with important things to contribute, 
their agency, and, as a result, their identity would be supported. Perhaps instead of completely 
stopping this person from cooking, her family members help her in the kitchen, but manage the 
more dangerous tasks. Instead of disabling people when they struggle to carry out their regular 
behaviours independently, we can provide some assistance to them to act as ‘themselves’. 
So far this discussion of agency-based theories has provided a more detailed picture of how a 
person’s identity can be affected in dementia, compared to the object-based theories. It has not 
yet addressed the questions that arise from the problematic cases described in the introduction. 
More specifically, it does not yet inform us of when a particular choice or action should be 
regarded as autonomous and when they should not be. This requires closer analysis of what 
underpins an individual’s commitments to act on certain reasons and not others, and why 
certain values become more important to that individual than others. In Chapter One, I 
described ideas from Ronald Dworkin who argued that these significant commitments are 
based on what he calls our ‘critical interests’, which are formed through conscious deliberation 
about what makes our lives ‘successful as a whole’. In response to Dworkin, Agnieszka 
Jaworska has argued that critical interests are formed through a person’s sense of obligation to 
act in a certain way, and where failing to act in that way is detrimental to their self-esteem. 
On Dworkin’s account, if dementia causes a person to lose the cognitive capacities required to 
reflect on what makes their life successful as a whole, then they can no longer form or enact 
critical interests. Therefore, the decisions they make are simply guided by experiential interests 
and should not be regarded as autonomous. On this reasoning, he suggests that in cases similar 
to Margo’s an advanced directive to withhold treatments should be honoured over any 
contemporary decisions. For the other cases, if the same line of reasoning is applied, we must 
regard the actions made by both Mr O’Connor and Mr D as non-autonomous. By contrast, 
Jaworska argues that a person’s ability to act on their critical interests is a matter of degree, 
and that though people with dementia struggle to a greater degree than most other people, this 
does not mean that they do not hold, form or strive to act on them. This means that in managing 
a case like Margo’s, we may infer from the apparent enjoyment she takes in ‘reading her 
novels’ and participating in various other activities that she still values her life, despite what 
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she had expressed in the prior directive. In other words, the fact that she is still engaging in 
things that are meaningful and important to her, indicates that she is acting in ways that are true 
to who she is, and that these are reasons for her to receive treatment. If her responses to her 
circumstances changed as her dementia progresses, then the interpretation of her interests 
would change accordingly.  
From the discussion in Chapter Two, it may be observed that the process model of memory 
aligns neatly with Jaworska’s view, and with agency theories in general, by viewing memory 
as an active, agentive process, rather than a matter of passive retrieval of a stored object. 
Similarly, agency-based accounts of identity conceive the formation and expression of a 
person’s identity as a process constituted by decisions and actions. In short, remembering and 
‘being someone’ viz. having an identity, exist through actions, rather than as objects. 
Incorporating physical environments and intersubjective collaboration in a relational theory or 
social constructivist theory of identity, echoes the process model’s incorporation of media and 
intersubjective negotiation in the process of remembering. On this view, the deterioration of 
memory in dementia is a threat to identity, but not because ‘parts’ of the person are 
disappearing, but rather because the person is finding it more difficult to maintain the 
relationships that constitute their identity. As such, strategies used to support a person’s 
memory might also help these people maintain those relationships and thus support their 
identity. In this chapter, I have argued that a person’s identity and how it is affected by dementia 
can be modulated by our responses to their direct, or primary, impairments. It is possible to 
support the identity of a person with dementia, by understanding and engaging with what is 
significant to them, just as we might ‘unlock’ streams of information from people with memory 
problems by understanding the things that are meaningful to them and asking the right 
questions. Succeeding in this may assist these people to carry out meaningful decisions ‘as 
themselves’ viz. autonomously, and failing to do this would have detrimental effects on their 
identity. This idea is illustrated by Sabat through some other interactions with Dr. B, which 
had been further discussed by Jaworska.88 Dr. B refused to take part in the activities at the day 
care centre he attended several days a week, where he met with Sabat. When asked why he 
refused, Dr B. described these activities as “filler” and “something that doesn’t mean 
anything”. He compares this to engaging with Sabat in the interview study: “If I’m working 
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with you, I can-look, I can work in here for 30 times and all that, but in this group, I’m nothing.” 
Being unable to endorse the activities that are made available to him, Dr B is unable to act as 
himself, and this literally negates who he is. And we can say that Dr B advocating to take part 
in Sabat’s study is an autonomous choice, because it engages with things that are important to 
him, in this case, science.  
On the view I am advancing, autonomous actions are exhibited in the meaning that a person 
finds in their activities, e.g. the meaning Margo finds in her ‘novel reading’ and the meaning 
Dr B finds in participating in Sabat’s study. In most cases of dementia, the person retains this 
capacity to find meaning. However, as described in Chapter Three, there are cases were this 
capacity seems to be profoundly altered, viz. some cases of bvFTD. The behaviour of people 
with this kind of dementia seems so much ‘out of character’ that we seem forced to conclude 
that their capacity to evaluate their situation has been profoundly impaired. This phenomenon 
has been explored by Antonio Damasio in his book Descarte’s Error.89 In contrast to Sabat’s 
Mr D, the people Damasio describes appear unable to attach meaning to any outcomes of a 
decision and so seem to have lost their agency. Damasio offers a modern neurobiological 
interpretation for the abrupt personality changes in a well-known case, Phineas Gage, and one 
of his own patients, ‘Elliot’. Phineas Gage was an American railroad construction worker who 
had an accident at work in 1848 where a metal bar went through his skull. Following the 
accident, Gage appeared remarkably functional in some cognitive domains but had 
considerable changes in his personality – as his friends put it: “Gage was no longer Gage.” 
Moreover, Gage seemed no longer able to function well in society, no longer being able to hold 
down a job, often using profane speech and treating co-workers poorly, making future plans 
and then abandoning them quickly for others. Damasio compares Gage with Elliot, who after 
suffering from ventromedial frontal lobe damage had similar problems. While Elliot still scored 
very highly in IQ and cognitive testing, he was unable to make decisions, especially in social 
or personal matters. Both of these cases exhibit similar symptomologies to some cases of severe 
dementia and those with bvFTD. From these patients’ presentations, Damasio argues that 
damage to the ventromedial pre-frontal region of the brain is the cause for this change and that 
this region is critical for normal decision making through mediation of emotional investment 
and valuing. Damage to these areas meant that these men were incapable of caring about the 
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outcomes of their decisions. Although they possessed the cognitive capabilities to understand 
the decision (weighing up costs and benefits), they did not attach any emotional significance 
to the available options and so were unable to make a choice they cared about, making their 
decisions non-autonomous. 
Damasio’s analysis may be useful in comparing cases like Mr O’Connor and Mr D. Because 
Mr O’Connor’s change of mind to no longer receive medical treatment can be linked to his loss 
of his wife, it can be understood as a meaningful decision. By contrast, it seems difficult to find 
a justifiable and meaningful reason for Mr D’s actions, so we could regard these as non-
autonomous, concluding that his dementia has progressed to the point where his agency is 
significantly impeded. According to this line of reasoning, FTD presents a greater threat to a 
person’s identity, likely because it affects the brain areas that are important for decision making 
and emotional investment, as identified by Damasio. The implication is that while there is much 
we can do to sustain a person’s agency through many forms of cognitive impairment, there are 
some functions related to our capacity to value without which a person cannot act. In some 
respects, we may view this as no different from a person’s dependence on other ‘vital’ organs. 
The important difference is that the body of the person lives on, and certain residues of the self 
continue, meaning that our obligations to the person as a person also remain, despite the 
inevitable changes to the relationships involved.  
4.4  Personhood 
As stated in the introduction, it is sometimes thought that a being who was previously 
considered a person can somehow to cease to be ‘a person’ due to the significant cognitive 
impairment present in advanced dementia. This notion leads to the conclusion that these beings 
no longer carry the same moral status as persons and so it would perhaps not be wrong to 
withhold life-sustaining treatments, or perhaps even administer life-ending treatments to these 
beings. Before continuing, I will reiterate that these issues are very complex and carry 
significant weight and so my treatment of them is limited by the scope of this thesis. 
Nonetheless, let us reconsider the theories of personhood described in the first chapter, in light 
of the discussions on personal identity. 
Firstly, John Noonan’s theory of personhood, the human criterion, is rather unhelpful when 
considering advanced dementia. This is because the genetic make-up of a person with dementia 
and the humanness of their parents is unchanged throughout the course of disease. As such, 
this approach would regard personhood as necessarily unaffected. However, as noted in 
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Chapter One, this view of personhood also seems to extends the same moral status to 
anencephalic babies, brain-dead patients sustained by life support and perhaps even dead 
bodies, which are generally not considered as carrying the same moral significance as persons. 
Using a cognitive criterion to determine personhood, such as those put forward by Locke or 
Kant, or contemporary theorists Mary Anne Warren or Peter Singer, brings the personhood of 
a patient with advance dementia’s into question. This is because these theories determine moral 
status based on a kind of ‘personhood test’, and these usually include a list of cognitive 
functions. Given that most patients with advanced dementia would fail any of these tests due 
to their significant cognitive impairment, it would follow that these patients have indeed lost 
the moral consideration of personhood. This conclusion is somewhat problematic though, as 
many families of patients with advanced dementia continue to regard their loved one as a 
person and would consider the notion of ‘killing them’ abhorrent. As such, a cognitive criterion 
of personhood is perhaps too cut-and-dried. 
Charles Taylor’s approach looks to “peculiarly human behaviours”, like pride, shame and 
honour, when determining if a being is a person. As such, someone using this approach may 
conclude that when a patient with advanced dementia no longer behaves in such ways they are 
no longer a person. However, Taylor’s approach also focuses on the potentiality of a being to 
behave in these ways. For instance, he states that “those who through some accident or 
misfortune are deprived of the ability to exercise these capacities are still understood as 
belonging to the species defined by this potentiality.”90 And so, it is likely that Taylor would 
conclude that advanced dementia cannot strip someone of their personhood. Perhaps this view, 
like the cognitive criterion, is too definitive, as it does not account for the inverse cases, where 
families consider it abhorrent to keep their loved one with advanced dementia alive. It seems a 
complete account of personhood must allow some degree of nuance for cases of advanced 
dementia. 
A gradient theory is perhaps helpful in this, as it changes the perspective of a personhood test 
from pass/fail to one of degree. If we consider personhood to be something that develops 
gradually, then it seems to follow that it is something that can be lost gradually as we lose the 
functions or behaviours considered essential for it. However, as noted in Chapter One, this does 
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not provide any clear answers to the practical questions that have been discussed. Carl Elliot’s 
claim that we cannot avoid approaching these issues with a pre-existing moral attitude is 
perhaps more helpful. This approach allows for a range of views on personhood (which the 
personhood tests do not), and partly explain how some members of a family might be emphatic 
that their loved one with advanced dementia is undoubtedly still a person, while others might 
hold that they are not. Though each person holds their position as ‘morally correct’ (this is not 
a ‘relativist’ position), they cannot be fully articulated in moral discussion, or made universally 
convincing through moral philosophy.  
A social constructivist approach, like the one put forward by Hilde Lindemann, is perhaps 
useful also, as it holds that personhood is somewhat dependent the construction of a being’s 
personal identity. On the agency-based account of personal identity I arrived at through my 
previous discussion, a patient with advanced dementia should continue to be regarded as a 
person if they continue to make meaningful choices and actions and they are treated as a person 
through natural, everyday actions by those around them. Contrastingly, if a patient has no 
awareness of their situation nor control of their body it seems that they would be unable to 
make any meaningful decisions or actions, and so perhaps no longer be regarded as a person. 
However, this conclusion remains problematic in that judgments about what constitutes a 
meaningful action are contestable. Some family members might say that simply being in the 
‘company’ of their loved one is a meaningful human act, and that their life retains value 
accordingly.  
In dealing with these issues, there is a difficult tension between promoting and sustaining a 
shared conception of the worth of human lives, especially in situations of debilitation or 
impairment, and recognising the limits of medical interventions, and when our efforts to help 
are in fact not helping. A proper treatment of this conception of ‘personhood’ requires more 
attention than I can give it here; what I have sketched are possible ways that different theorists 
might approach the issue. However, it seems that the approaches which allow some variation 
due to intersubjective meaning are a more appropriate way to understand personhood in a 
dementia context.  
4.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have outlined a theoretical shift away from object-based theories of identity 
towards agency-based theories. I did this by reviewing the theories I introduced in Chapter One 
and then integrating the information in Chapters Two and Three. I also described the failings 
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of object theories and how agency theories better explain the experience of those with 
dementia. Within agency theories, I examined how a person’s choices and actions can be 
informed by the social and physical environments surrounding them and how these too can 
positively and negatively affect a person’s identity. Using an agency approach, I justified the 
conflicting position outlined in the introduction where some choices people with dementia 
make are regarded as autonomous and others as not, based on the meaning those choices carry. 
In the next chapter I will describe the qualitative study I carried out as part of this research 
project. I will report the results of this study and discuss how they compare with the conclusions 
drawn in this chapter.  
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Chapter Five - Interviews 
Dementia in its various forms can gives rise to difficult ethical and philosophical problems. 
These problems may be encountered by clinicians making treatment decisions for patients with 
dementia, or in the day-to-day work of those caring for people with dementia. In the first three 
chapters of this thesis I discussed theories of identity, the nature of memory, and the current 
pathological and clinical understanding of dementias. In Chapter Four I presented a broad 
theoretical account of how identity is affected by dementia, drawing on those previous chapters. 
I argued that identity needs to be understood in terms of agency, and that agency is socially 
and environmentally conditioned. On this account, a person expresses and becomes who they 
are through their interactions with the world of persons and things. Actions (including 
thoughts) are always undertaken through a body, and hence emergent physical deficits will 
generally present a threat to identity. However, in many cases such threats may be met by 
adapting the activities that the person undertakes, and by finding new ways to express or remain 
connected to the life which the affected person has enjoyed. Society has a critical role in this 
process, and can either support or hinder a person’s efforts to adapt, depending on the options 
and avenues that are made available to them. 
As noted throughout, the position outlined in Chapter Four has been developed using a range 
of philosophical and empirical sources. These include some studies reporting and interpreting 
the views of those experienced in caring for people with dementia.91 Such perspectives are very 
valuable to ascertain, as they ensure that theoretical work is motivated by genuine problems, 
and also test the value of theoretical solutions to practical problems. For this reason a qualitative 
study was incorporated into this dissertation process. Although there are existing qualitative 
studies focussing on patient perspectives on how identity is affected by dementia, this study is 
unique in the way that it directly focussed on clinicians’ perspectives of how identity is affected 
by dementia, and whether advance directives should be applied for patients who have dementia. 
In this chapter I will report on the findings of this study and discuss what they mean in the light 
of the previous theoretical discussion.  
                                                 
 
91 Linemann et al., Beyond Loss, Chapter Four: “I’m his wife not his carer!”—Dignity and Couplehood in 
Dementia; Sabat, S. R. "Surviving Manifestationsof Selfhood in Alzheimer's Disease: A Case Study." Dementia 
1, no. 1 (2002): 25-36. 
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Although the views of certain experts can be used to ‘test’ theoretical conclusions to a certain 
extent, they cannot be used as ‘proof’ of a theory’s accuracy or truth. The value in the 
clinicians’ views is that they are formed with an awareness of the situations in which those 
problems arise, and their perspectives can therefore convey special insight into ethical 
problems. However, they cannot be used as self-evident ‘facts’. This is because the 
phenomenon being described, and the concepts being used to describe that phenomena, require 
interpretation and some pre-existing theoretical work. This, I suggest, is evident in the 
difficulty that participants have in expressing their views, and by the variety of views 
expressed. Thus, the views need to be considered critically. Hence, as I present the views I 
shall also offer some commentary on how they may be interpreted, and what they mean for the 
theory discussed in the previous chapter.  
5.1 Method 
This study used a general inductive approach.92 Key topics and questions were developed from 
a literature review and prior theoretical work. This established the broad objectives of the study, 
but the understanding and interpretation of these objectives remained open in the analysis of 
the findings. The objectives were to understand how experienced clinicians working in 
dementia care understand the effect of dementia on identity, and how they viewed the ethical 
problems that can arise in dementia, particularly in the application of advances directives.  
Participants were invited to participate via email. The invitation email outlined the project and 
what would be required in participating. An information sheet was attached which described 
the purpose of the study in more detail, as well as the topics that were likely to be discussed in 
the interview. The topics were listed as follows:  
• How identity is conceptualized in clinical settings, and how it is perceived to be affected 
by dementia. 
• Whether the loss of ‘autobiographical’ memory brings about a loss of identity, and how 
identity can be sustained in patients whose memory is deteriorating.  
• How ‘advance care plans’ are used in dementia care, and whether apparent changes in 
identity or personality affect the value in their implementation  
                                                 
 
92 Thomas, D. R. "A General Inductive Approach for Analyzing Qualitative Evaluation Data." American Journal 
of Evaluation 27, no. 2 (2006): 237-46. 
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• What means or measures are used in assessing whether a patient is able to make 
particular decisions.  
• Any further issues you see as relevant to this area. 
These topics formed the basis of the interview questions, however, as the interviews were semi-
structured, the order and extent to which each topic was addressed varied according to each 
participant’s responses. Out of respect for the privacy rights of the participants’ and those of 
their patients, no specific, identifiable, patient information was discussed in the interviews, and 
no identifying participant information is included in any reporting of the study. Participation 
was entirely voluntary throughout.  
Seven participants were recruited for the study using a ‘snowball’ recruitment method.93 
Participants came from a range of healthcare disciplines94, but each had at least twelve years 
of experience working which people with dementia. All those invited to participate agree to do 
so.  
All the interviews were conducted by me, either in person or via video-conferencing. The 
interviews were recorded on an audio recording device and then transcribed by me. The 
transcripts were then coded using NVIVO v11. My primary supervisor (SW) and I then 
undertook independent parallel coding, whereby we each read the interviews closely and 
created and applied codes according to our respective understandings of the study objectives. 
The results were then compared and discussed. There was considerable overlap between the 
two sets of codes that were developed and in how they were applied. Where there was variation, 
the transcripts were reviewed to check interpretation. Following this, we both independently 
identified the key themes in the findings, and then worked together drafting a written 
presentation of the findings. This draft was then emailed to the participants individually, along 
with copies of their interview transcripts. Participants were specifically notified of instances 
where their interviews have been quoted, and were invited to comment on or correct our 
interpretation. No participants offered corrections. 
                                                 
 
93 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods: Integrating Theory and Practice (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2015)  
 
94 These included representatives of geriatric psychiatry, gerontology, clinical psychology, occupational therapy, 
general practice, and palliative care. 
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I expect that my interview technique improved throughout the process simply through practice 
and gaining more mastery over the ideas discussed. Furthermore, these interviews were carried 
out before writing the majority of this thesis. At the time the interviews were conducted, certain 
ideas were still developing. If I were to conduct a similar interview study after the writing of 
this thesis, the lines of questioning may have a slightly different process. This is in keeping 
with the general inductive approach.  
5.2 Findings and analysis  
The participants’ offered a range of perspective on what identity is and how it is affected by 
dementia. They variously related identity to activities, roles, relationships, and in one case a 
persisting sense of self. Several emphasised the positive role that carers and social support 
structures can have in helping people to adapt to the impairments caused by dementia, and so 
preserve their identity. Others described the challenges dementia could present to carers and 
families, particularly in responding to the profound dependency of the previously independent 
person, and to behaviours that were significantly ‘out-of-character’ for the person. Participants 
whose clinical work involved situations where advance directives might be applied expressed 
caution regarding how they should be used in dementia care. While they thought records of 
prior wishes could be useful for understanding a patient’s values and preferences, they stressed 
the complexity of the decisions that can arise, and how difficult it can be to anticipate the 
circumstances and options available.  
5.2.1 Participants’ conceptions of identity and dementia  
When asked how they understood the terms ‘identity’ and ‘personhood’, participants 
mentioned a range of factors or concepts. Some used examples of people or patients they had 
encountered to illustrate their ideas, while others responded directly with a general account. 
Participants would also often explain their view of identity by describing how it is either 
threatened or sustained through dementia. The themes identified in the interviews are broadly 
coherent with the position argued for in Chapter Four, but also raise some further 
considerations and issues to resolve. 
Activities and roles as important to identity 
Several participants described an agency-based approach to identity, often identifying activities 
and roles as important in defining identity. A subset of this group also described ways that 
identity might be threatened as people become unable to perform such activities or role due to 
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the progression of dementia. One participant gave an example in which dementia is “taking 
away” a specific kind of activity (driving) that is seen as “integral” to the patient’s identity: 
Because of the dementia, yep, so simple one ah and it's very much in my mind today 
because of a patient I've recently seen, it's someone who I've had to tell must stop 
driving because they are not capable of safely driving anymore. But for this man, the 
fact that "I am a driver" is so integral to his identity, that I've taken- it feels to him as 
if I've taken away an important part of who he is. He's lost it forever, he's very angry 
about that and he will grieve about that for quite a while. Participant 1 
Another participant described the connection between identity and activities in more general 
terms, and emphasised the importance of agency in everyday activities and pleasurable hobbies 
within individualised social and physical environments: 
P2: As a [particular kind of healthcare profession], identity is a core part of what we 
think about in our, in our work.  
AB: Mmhm. 
P2: And I, I, you know, I can't think about identity without thinking about roles. 
About routines and rituals, the habits that we have and umm, the meaning that we 
place on certain activities in our life. So, umm, they're probably the, ah - Oh, 
relationships of course, so. So yeah, as [a particular kind of healthcare profession]95 
we see us as individuals who have constant interactions with the social and physical 
environment and, and in, in those, within those interactions there's always going to be 
an activity of some sort... whether it's your mundane activities of daily living, right 
through to you know, your work activities, your interests, your umm, the things you 
do in terms of social relationships. So umm, when those things are removed, identity 
is at risk. Or if those things have, are compromised, identity is at risk. So, you know, 
the way in which we do a task, the way. I was talking to my students on Wednesday 
actually, I had them with me and we were talking about ADLs, activities of daily 
living and you know, something as simple as noticing as when you have a shower... 
Participant 2  
This link between identity and activities broadly aligns with the agency-based accounts of 
identity described in previous chapters (activities being expressions of agency). It follows that 
in so far as dementia limits or removes the capacity for agency, it will threaten identity. 
Participant 2’s descriptions reinforce Jaworska’s view of identity, in that it suggests that a 
person’s agency can be constituted by every day activities that are critical to their sense of self-
worth, particularly where they involve social relationships or work. 
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Perhaps with an agency-based approach in mind, some participants noted the importance on 
focusing on activities the person with dementia are still capable of, rather than focusing on the 
deficits in their abilities. For example: 
But I’m sure there are things she can still do, but for that I ask one of my occupational 
therapists to go and see her and really do a more detailed assessment, getting to know 
the- you know, I'm sure she had other things she enjoyed in life that you know we can 
support her to do those. Participant 3 
And: 
The colouring books are great. So fantastic. I've got a whole lot of people who are 
discovering them because they often can colour in. My father could paint when he was 
demented and he could never paint a month of Sundays when he was normal and he 
was - he got some stuff finished. He used to come back with paintings he was really 
proud of but- And people might think that's demeaning but in fact, doing things like 
that, if you can do anything that you can do, that you can engage in, that isn't too 
stressful, it’s lovely to be able to produce things- but a lot of people want to, want to, 
you know, take them out for meals, do all sorts of- but in fact that's often really, really 
stressful. Participant 4  
Indeed, some participants described finding new activities to do or new roles to fill as being 
hugely beneficial for people with dementia: 
One gentleman, now he's gardening now at the Botanic Gardens, so he's raking leaves, 
you know, he’s right in there during autumn or winter you know, he's out there helping. 
And he said to me the first time I met him, "you know, I got a diagnosis of dementia 
and it was like I was placed into a cocoon. Nobody wanted me to do anything in case I 
hurt myself or injure myself or” umm and he said "I lost myself and I come here and 
I've found myself again because I'm giving back, I'm doing something, it's returning me 
to me." Participant 2 
In this particular example, the idea that the man had “lost” himself when he was denied 
opportunities to actively contribute to the community reinforces the basic link between agency 
and identity. More specifically, it fits with Korsgaard’s theory that a person forms and sustains 
their identity by acting on reasons that they can reflectively endorse (i.e. reasons that are in line 
with their values)96. The idea that this person ‘found’ himself again through an activity that he 
recognised as meaningful (as “giving back”) affirms Jaworska’s claim that a person with mild 
or moderate dementia may still form and act on ‘critical interests’, and also her characterisation 
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of those interests as involving others (or some value beyond the person’s immediate 
experience) and as being related to the person sense of self-esteem. This example echoes 
Sabat’s case of Dr B, who felt similarly impaired by the activities of his day-care facility and 
found value in participating in engaging in something meaningful, viz. Sabat’s study. 
The activities mentioned by participants as important to identity were not always relating to a 
patient’s occupations or hobbies; some also referred to roles within critical relationships. 
Participant 3 for example, observed:  
So for say, relationships - often that's changed in the roles. Like a husband and wife 
team, say the husband has dementia, the wife may become the main caregiver and that 
can sometimes unravel some of the longer term issues within that relationship. At the 
same time, we really, really value the family input because really when we see someone 
with dementia, we can't see just that person, we have to see their immediate family. 
Participant 3 
This comment draws a link between roles and identity in suggesting that knowing the family 
is a necessary part of knowing the individual. The suggestion that consulting a person’s 
immediate family is needed to have a full account of their identity is in line with a social 
constructivist approach, which holds that a person’s identity is partly constituted by the ways 
others view them. This quote also highlights that roles within relationships can change as 
dementia progresses and how this can indirectly threaten a person’s identity. Some participants 
emphasised how challenging such changes in roles within relationships, and corresponding 
changes in identity, could be for couples and families. Participant 2 put this point as follows: 
I think, from the family's perspective, it is a very real thing that they see a loss of the 
person they once knew. I believe a lot of that is around the roles that people hold. So 
on one hand, yes, a person living with dementia may become disoriented to person, so 
they may start recognising a daughter or a spouse as a father or a sister or you know, so 
there is that degree of confusion. But a lot of it is about, I believe, the fact again that 
the roles reverse and roles often do reverse as we age. You know, my umm, my Dad's 
not that old but umm my Mum died 5 years ago and umm, he's not got his you know 
companion for life and my Mum ran the house, you know so his, so our, my role, you 
know I cook for my Dad a lot more than I would have once done… Participant 2  
Participant 4 made similar observations, and quoted a patient who said “often there's an awful 
lot of glossing over dementia and trying to make it look as if it's you know not as bad as it is.”, 
and then went on to say: 
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But for the people that have it and the people that look after them, it's, it's so bad, you 
know, and it's their loss of personhood97 that is the hardest thing to deal with I think. 
You know, it's the loss of, it's the... You've lost a mate, you've lost a person who looked 
out for you and who had contributed to the relationship and then you've gained a person 
who is now a dependant and you've gained a person who is often like a child again 
because they've got such terrible sort of separation anxiety. Participant 4 
This participant is drawing a clear link between changes in capacities (becoming a 
“dependant”) and changes in identity. The wife of the patient went on to say that this “glossing 
over” was “insulting” to her and her husband who has dementia, and she stressed that he was 
“not the same person he was” (quoted by Participant 4). Building on this point, the participant 
described how as dementia progresses patients will work hard to convey who they are by 
talking about things they have done in the past. This idea is similar to Sabat’s description of 
personal present, with the example of the lawyer, Mr. K.98 
And most peoples' very long term memory is intact. But as they get worse and worse 
and worse, more and more of that sort of feeds away and I think it's really sad that they 
can. But they do want to project who they were rather than who they are now, even if 
they're demented. They love talking about the things they've done and they'll talk 
forever. You know they'll tell you the same story 100 times, but that's really good for 
them. Because they've really got that need to project their identity. And that was the 
man that talked about dementia. He could say "look, I know I can't do this. I know I'm 
a burden on my wife, it drives me crazy, but I can't do anything about it." And that was 
really you know sad and he said "I know that I want to think things through but it just 
doesn't happen. I know exactly what I want to say I can't say the words, I try to calculate 
my head, I try to do all the things I could and I just can't do it." But he could express 
that brilliantly which was just amazing... Participant 4 
The sense of loss that many people experience with dementia is undeniable. However, as 
already indicated, some participants described ways that a person with dementia could adapt, 
or be supported, to sustain a sense of identity despite the impairments. These views are perhaps 
more evident in the comments made more directly about the link between identity and 
relationships.  
Relational identity 
                                                 
 
97 Note that the use of “personhood” here likely refers to what this thesis describes as personal identity and not 
personhood. This misuse of terms reinforces the difficulty in discussing these issues as important terms mean 
different things to different parties. 
98 Lindemann et al., Beyond Loss, Chapter Two: The Person with Dementia as Understood through Stern’s Critical 
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The previous section focussed on ways participants linked identity to our ability to perform 
certain task or fulfil certain roles. Some participants also linked identity directly to the 
relationships that people have. There is an obvious overlap between these themes, as the 
concept of a ‘role’ generally implies some kind of relationship, and also a set of normative 
standards that we will endeavour to meet and which others may hold us to. Indeed, one might 
say that roles are constitutive of the relationships we have (for example, to relate to someone 
as a parent one must perform the role of a parent). One participant described understanding a 
person’s family relationships as a critical part of knowing who they are: 
Yeah, um. Yes, identity... I think for me, it's getting to know the person, as a person. 
And work in psychiatry, we- really as part of our routine assessment is to know about 
the person's family umm, that's actually probably of the first questions I ask, when I 
come across a -you know, see a new person- and I'll be asking their family. Their 
family supports, their relationship, where this person's role is in the family. So that, 
that sort of covers current family, situations and also the past. And I find it quite 
useful, for me to get to know this person. Because. I know, no one exists in isolation 
and for me it's quite a good start to get to know the person, just ask about their family 
and their relationships Umm. Of course, then I usually ask about the person's 
occupational history, umm, yeah. Yep. Their interests and their hobbies. Yep. 
Participant 3 
Another participant described the social and interactive nature of identity, and then suggested 
that the notion that a person’s identity could be independent of relationships was an artefact of 
“Western culture”:  
Well, I think it's a mistake to claim that there is a single locus [of identity]. So I think 
it's a... it exists in a dynamic interplay between various aspects of the person, their 
context and especially their social and cultural context. But in Western culture, 
because we're quite hyper-individualistic, we have a bias towards thinking that 
identity, selfhood, personhood, personality, are all inside us. This is not a sufficient 
explanation but that's our cultural bias I think. Whereas other cultures, especially 
Confucian and traditional Maori in this country, would see those things as much more 
suspended or related in where you stand in relation to the land or your family or other 
people. Participant 1 
The participant went on to suggest that this exacerbates the threat posed by dementia, because 
it renders a person’s identity wholly vulnerable to the internal pathological processes, while a 
relational understanding of identity provides a way that identity can be preserved despite the 
loss of capacities caused by dementia:  
P1: So it's a Western cultural expression of what our response is to dementia if we 
believe that the heart of being a person is holding my identity in myself. So if that's 
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our cultural bias, then if I lose my marbles then I've lost everything. But I don't think 
that's actually true. But I think that drives the "this is not my Mum" [comments] 
AB: So because this person can't enact their own identity- 
P1: Yeah, as they used to. 
AB: -as they used to, then we feel like they - well these people describing their 
parents in that way - feel that way. But it seems like you think they do hold onto some 
part of their identity. 
P1: Well there's - their identity is capable of being preserved. 
AB: Okay, in what ways? 
P1: It has to be invested in the social network then because it is true that dementia will 
eventually erode my capacity to hold onto my identity myself. The previous bits of it - 
I am still who I am right now but all the history which is clearly an important part of 
my identity may be inaccessible to me and how I'm acting now might be a different 
way to how I used to act. So dementia will do that at some point. So, umm, to 
maintain that part - that connection with my previous self - I'm going to need to have 
other people do that for me. Participant 1 
In elaborating on this point the participant provided the following example:  
And we will hold for you, your sense of who you are, which wasn't primarily about 
what you did in your life anyway. It was about the fact that you belonged to this Iwi 
and this Hapu with this land and this Marae and this role and you still have those 
things. So I remember the story of someone's Dad who was living on the Marae 
clearly with dementia but they just couldn't run anything on the Marae without him 
being there to say the Karakia and just be there. But he was pretty useless at the 
Karakia now so they have to say them for him, but he still had to be there because he 
was still that guy. Brilliant! Participant 1 
The idea that a person’s identity is constituted in, and can be sustained through, relationships 
is in accordance with the several contemporary ‘relational theorists’, some of whom were 
mentioned earlier in this thesis.99 The suggestion that ‘individualistic’, i.e. non-relational, 
conceptions of identity are products of our Western cultural tradition is plausible, given the 
influence that Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant have had on Western philosophical, political 
and scientific developments. These philosophers build their systems on the foundation of 
individual thought and experience, and so conceive the being of the person in terms of isolation 
rather than connection. Alternative systems, founded on more holistic conceptions of being, 
are available in Aristotle and Spinoza, but their views are less well-known, and less influential. 
                                                 
 
99Discussed in Chapter One of this thesis p25-7 
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However, despite the positive aspects of these relational ideas, there is still a need to account 
for the individual as an individual, and to acknowledge the limits to which a person can be 
sustained through social or cultural supports. This is evident in the remarks made in previous 
section about the ‘loss of self’ that is experienced with the progression of dementia, even within 
what appear to be functioning relationships (notice that the case cited involved a married couple 
who had evidently been very close). It seems that the grief that comes with such loss needs to 
be negotiated as a person adapts to new roles and activities that remain achievable with 
dementia. 
Identity as grounded in a continuous feeling 
One participant highlighted a more individual conception of identity, not conveyed in the 
concepts of activities, roles or relationships discussed so far. This is the idea that identity is 
sustained through a basic sense or feeling of self that persist through a life time: 
Well the person I was assessing today looked at me... You know, it's that person's 
birthday, they turned 94. And say to me, "I don't feel any different. Because you know 
24 years ago, I was doing fine." and I said "you weren't 94, 24 years ago though, so 
that's what's different." But it's true that the person in themselves, you know, they 
could feel the same as when they did when they were 21, but why would that change? 
Just because their external body has aged, in themselves, they feel no different. And 
this is something that I think, umm, a person tends to retain. Umm, even when they're 
quite impaired. There's just kind of a sense of self, which is more than just existing, 
it's, you know that combination of personality and intelligence, umm, having 
peculiarities, preferences and, umm, feeling pain from different sorts of things. Umm, 
feeling umm attracted to or allied to different people, but not being able to perhaps 
explain that. That doesn't change, it's still there. Participant 5 
This idea echoes the view put forward by neurologist Antonio Damasio, who argues we are 
aware of our identity through the operation our continuous conscious monitoring of how we 
are in the world, and in the feelings of joy, sadness and desire that accompany this.100 There is 
also an overlap with the comments of Participant 2 quoted earlier about the importance of each 
person’s unique patterns of behaviour and mannerisms in constituting their identity.101 One 
might say that these outward usually, unconscious, behaviour are external expressions of the 
internal, engrained patterns of feeling that each person develops through their repeated 
                                                 
 
100 Damasio, Antonio R. Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain. New York: Pantheon Books, 
2010. 
101 First quote by Participant 2, p72 
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interactions with others (and in the sense they are not entirely individual). This idea can also 
be connected to agency-based accounts of identity, if we understanding the continuous feeling 
as monitoring of our actions, i.e. a sense of how well we are actualising our potential, living in 
accordance with our values and are able to ‘act as ourselves’. 
Memory and identity 
Although memory was not directly asked about in the interviews, several participants discussed 
memory as a concept important to dementia and identity.102 There was evidence of both 
archival and process models being employed by participants. Overall, memory was regarded 
as a somewhat important but far from sufficient criterion for identity.  
One participant used archival metaphors when describing memory: 
I'm sure that memory is like that and I'm sure the reason your childhood memories are 
so good is they were formed when your brain was young and your hard drive wasn't 
full and your memory banks were empty and those memories were well encoded and 
will you know stay with most people the rest of your life. And then as you get older, 
you know, your brain is not nearly so good at encoding new memories and ehm, the 
hard drive's full of rubbish. Participant 4 
However, the same participant also goes on to use aspects of a process model when describing 
how people are able to remember more when they are engaged in discussion relevant to them, 
and through the use of memory media such as “note books and records and photographs”: 
They'll often remember nothing, then you can get in there, you can see. When they can't 
even tell you what they did, you know that they're so far gone that it's really sad because 
they've almost lost the memory of who they were. But if you talk to them about the old 
days then you can really sort of cog into how they think and how they thought in those 
days and then you can sort of see what the changes are to what they are now. So I think 
peoples' past is huge and for demented people, I think that people that keep, you know, 
note books and records and photographs and things that they can look back at is a 
fantastic thing. Because once those memories are gone, they're gone for good. But 
actually having them there [in the note books and records and photographs] to go back 
to, is really good. Participant 4 
                                                 
 




Another participant emphasised how memories can be shaped by the purpose they are 
remembered for:  
… you know people tend to remember the past through rose coloured glasses, so... 
She... her... her memories may be... influenced by what she wants to remember. 
Participant 6  
The case referred to involved someone remembering her husband fondly. This idea links to the 
process model of memory, and reiterated the view that remembering is often an emotional 
process and not impartial or archival. In a similar vein, another participant described how 
engaging with people about topics that were important to them could elucidate many more 
details: 
the detail that she recalled, knowing what she had said to me about how much she 
couldn't remember, was phenomenal and it really highlighted to me just how much 
tapping into something that's truly meaningful and engaging … helps peoples' brain, 
umm, remember and maintain...[information] Participant 2 
Several participants argued that memory is an important part of identity. However, their views 
did not precisely align with a Lockean theory of identity, as none seemed to hold that memory 
is the sole constituent of identity. For example, one participant described that relationship as 
follows:  
my memory will fail or my ability to express what my memory can tell me will fail at 
some point, then I won't remember who I am or be able to communicate who I am in a 
reliable way, so that will change who I am. At least from the vantage point of others. 
Participant 1 
The final part of this quote, describing how identity is affected “from the vantage point of 
others” when memory is impaired, actually evokes a social constructivist view of personal 
identity, rather than a Lockean approach. It also appears that being able to express one’s mental 
life is important for this social construction and if communication is impaired, then the process 
of construction would also be impaired. It also implies some ‘self-concept’ of personal identity 
based on memory. However, even in acknowledging this, one participant also made the 
contrary point, by asserting that aspects of a person’s identity are not necessary lost simply 
because that person is unable to remember it, and that there are parts of identity that memory 
does not encapsulate: 
when our memory declines, then we lose our identity, we lose ourselves. But reacting 
to that, I think and what you've said as well, identity is about so much more than what 
you remember... I think that some of it is hard wired by genes. Like whether you.... 
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whether you get pleasure out of roller coasters. You don't have to remember even going 
to Cedar Point as a 6-year-old or whatever. ... You don't have to remember, you don't 
have to associate it with a pleasurable experience as a child, you don't have to remember 
that. Either you're somebody who likes it or you're somebody who doesn't and that's 
based on genes. Participant 6 
The thought that identity may have an inherent genetic component was also mentioned by other 
participants: 
So we've probably born or formed with a temperament. We're born with the genetic 
blueprint for a temperament and then life experiences will cause that to be refined or 
sharpened or dulled or whatever in various ways. ... but our genes are expressed 
variably in relation to our environment, so even to say it's in your genes, immediately 
we've got an interplay with what's going on around us. Participant 1 
Another participant also downplayed the importance of memory, focusing on present 
experiences for personal identity: 
So apart from that very, very end stage, I think people do have some identity because 
they have an ability to experience pleasure or pain, experience pleasure or distress and 
to some extent, maybe express it or maybe not. The fact that they don't remember it, is 
not relevant to the experience of it. Participant 7 
Overall, the participants did not support the memory theory of identity put forward by Locke 
and maintained by many contemporary theorists. While participants recognised an important 
link between memory and identity, and the fact that the loss of memory in dementia can have 
a profound effect on a person’s identity, they also described how Locke’s theory is problematic 
in ways similar to my discussions in Chapters One and Four. 
5.2.2 Summary discussion of participants’ view on dementia and identity 
When discussing the effects dementia has on identity, a range of answers were explored. It 
seems that as both identity and dementia are individually complex and nuanced topics, the ways 
they interact are particularly complex and nuanced. Participants recognised that brain 
pathology can significantly affect personal identity, which I described as the ‘direct effects’ 
dementia has. Following an agency model, the threat to identity posed by dementia is a product 
of the decline in capacities that dementia causes. In others words, a person become less 
themselves because they are less able to act in the ways that are engrained and familiar 
expression of who they are. For example, when a person can no longer fulfil a certain role (such 
as ‘partner’), because they are unable to perform the tasks they once did, then their identity is 
threatened. Given the important links that participants described between identity and 
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relationships, it is reasonable to infer that of the various forms of dementia, frontotemporal 
dementia poses the greatest threat to identity. This is because the form of cognitive impairment 
involved affects the structures that operate as we judge how to interact with others, and so 
impair our ability to sustain relationships. 
The participants also emphasised the importance of what I have described as ‘indirect effects’ 
of dementia. In particular, they highlighted the ways that other people respond to the person 
with dementia’s direct impairments (e.g. treating a person differently because they are unable 
to do the things they used to). This often occurs when a person’s relationship to a person with 
dementia is changed from partner or parent to caregiver. In accordance with the agency-based 
accounts, we tend to construct identities (our own and others) around the ways people behave. 
If a person’s actions change, then naturally, our view of who they are changes too. 
Further indirect effects are evident in the language that can be used to describe people with 
dementia. These are often unintentional and can arise from good motives (e.g. the desire to care 
for or protect the person with dementia). An example is describing a person with dementia as 
vulnerable, and then preventing them from working in the kitchen, or in their workshop, 
because of safety concerns. Whilst necessary in some cases, such protective measure can be 
overdone, and can cause further disablement over and above what is actually caused by the 
physical impairments. Similarly, when a person is described as a ‘dementia sufferer’, or similar 
term, this implies that the person is entirely dependent or helpless, when in fact people with 
dementia may remain capable of many meaningful activities, if appropriate supports are put in 
place. This can become circular, as if we misinterpret peoples’ behaviour as evidence for 
dementia (behavioural symptoms), then we will be inclined to be more protective, and so 
further deny them opportunities to act.  
5.2.3 Personhood 
The concept of personhood was mentioned by a number of participants. Some drew a clear 
distinction between personhood and personal identity, while others spoke of them as 
overlapping concepts. There was a mixture of views as to whether or not personhood is taken 
away in advanced dementia, and a variety of explanations as to why this is or is not the case. 
For example, one participant described personhood as “more fundamental” and less changeable 
than personal identity, and as something that is shared with other persons but uniquely 
expressed in identity: 
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P1: personhood is a bit more fundamental. 
AB: Mmhm. 
P1: Because no matter what my identity is, I am- what changes in it, that doesn't change 
umm, my fundamental personhood, I think, which is those things that make me a 
person... at its most fundamental level - that make me a human. But there is a uniqueness 
to that too... So it's... Because personality is not... although every person has it, it's not 
identical because it varies, it expresses itself in our identity so therefore my personhood 
is unique - those things that make me a person, whilst I share them with every human 
on the planet, nonetheless they're unique to my particular personality and identity also... 
They're sort of related too... So that's how I'd see that. If that makes sense. Participant 
1 
Participant 3 also asserted that personhood persists even in severe dementia, regardless of how 
advanced: 
But, this person is still a person! It's just that he or she needs a lot of help. Yeah... For 
you know, patients are... Similar patients in the past I- even though you can't 
communicate with the person, you can still stay with the person, being with the person 
and that's umm. And you can't do that if that's not a person. So the- umm. It's quite 
important for people with severe dementia... You don't have to communicate, you can 
be there and provide some comfort or... Umm... have some connection... umm. And 
that's a person. Because you can't do that with umm, with an object. Connect... Eh... 
Well some people may... But yeah, for me, it's that connection regardless of how 
severe the dementia is. Participant 3 
It is perhaps significant that this participant has mentioned “being with the person” as a way of 
affirming or acknowledging their personhood. This link between relating and personhood was 
also discussed by another participant who held a comparatively well-formed view of 
personhood. Their view was that to be a person one must be able to experience some kind of 
enjoyment and be able to relate (or at least react) to others. However, in contrast to Participant 
3’s comments, this participant suggested that given sufficient time dementia can destroy these 
capacities: 
P6: That unless we have the ability to have relationships with other people, then we are 
not really in the "human potential." 
AB: Mmhm... 
P6: So people in vegetative states, people with end-stage dementia and new-born infants 
are not the same as everybody else... in the... who are able to umm at least have a social 
smile... or you know to be in some sort of a relationship. And the thing about new-borns 
is that that's temporary. 
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AB: And they quickly develop a social smile. 
P6: Yeah, right! Yeah, it takes 6 weeks, you know it's one of the very first things... it's 
like so wired into our brains. Umm, that for survival, it's one of the most important 
things for an infant, you know! Umm... but yeah, what's the point if you can experience 
pleasure but not - if you can experience pain but not pleasure, what's the point... of 
being alive? Of being a human? Of being an alive human being?  
… 
AB: So can I move on now to asking how you think those things are affected in 
dementia? So, your ability to form and continue relationships, and the ability to 
experience pleasure. 
P6: Yeah, I think that they're continued certainly through moderate dementia, umm. I 
think in severe dementia, umm, they can go away completely, or at the best, every once 
in a while in severe dementia, you know, has a surface of a smile or something where 
they seem to connect, but it's really hard to even know what that is. 
AB: Mmhm. 
P6: But yeah, I think by severe dementia it pretty much goes away. Participant 6 
The thought that personhood could potentially be destroyed by dementia was echoed by another 
participant who said that at the “very, very, end stage” of dementia there is no discernible of 
the person’s identity left, and hence nothing of the person: 
Is there something going in there that they are unable to communicate so that their sense 
of self may be preserved in there. So I'm not sure but no, nothing discernible. So at the 
very, very end, someone who is bed bound and unable to feed themselves and unable 
to walk and unable to talk, there's nothing that we can tell that there is any identity left. 
But until you get to that very, very end stage, I think that there's still something. 
Participant 7 
The disagreement by clinicians on whether or not dementia can destroy personhood reflects 
my comments regarding the intractability and contentiousness in definitively answering 
questions about personhood and dementia. As discussed in Chapters One and Four, the 
definitions of terms like personhood can be subjective and it is possible for one party to regard 
a being as clearly (still) having personhood, while other parties would be emphatic that they 
do not. This same distinction can also be evident on a smaller, personal scale when considering 
the family of a person with advanced dementia where one member may want to abandon life-
prolonging treatments while others might want to continue. Situations similar to this, involving 
decisions about end-of-life care and the role of advanced directives were also explored in the 
interviews and are detailed in the next section. 
85 
 
5.2.4 Advance directives  
The issue of advance directives was introduced to participants by way of the case examples 
described in the introduction and discussed in Chapter Four (most often Margo and Mr 
O’Connor). Typically, the participant would be asked to talk about how they would respond if 
there was an advance directive in place stipulating either a refusal or request for life-extending 
treatments, should they be medically indicated. 
In responding to these cases, several participants wanted more detail about the nature of the 
advanced directive that was hypothetically in place, and expressed doubts about whether an 
advance decision could adequately take account of all the possibilities and implications of the 
decision. One participant expressed this concern as follows:  
[T]he core problem with advanced directives [is that] you can say whatever you like 
but what actually happens is not usually something that you imagined. ... I’m much 
more in favour of advanced directives that say a few clear things and say why people 
think that. So that you can work with the ‘whys’ more than with the details. ... Although 
I encourage to move towards advanced care plans, and I bring up certain aspects like 
entry into care or ah, resuscitation regularly, I don't encourage people to write advanced 
directives outside of those mechanisms because people can never imagine what actually 
happens. Participant 1 
If a person does not understand the implications of a clinical treatment and the options available 
then they cannot consent to that treatment, at least according to most contemporary standards 
of informed consent.103 This extends to advance directives, in that we cannot hold people to 
their historical wishes when they did not have an accurate appreciation of the situation they 
would be in. Indeed, the problem of accurately understanding the complexities of any future 
situation may be as much a problem for the doctor as for the patient. The same participant goes 
on to say: 
… how can we say people have indeed exercised their capacity back in the day, when 
they weren't talking about the situation? They couldn't imagine it, so they didn't imagine 
it. Participant 1  
Some participants focussed on the ambiguity inherent in the notion of ‘life extending 
treatments’, referred to by commentators like Dworkin and Jaworska. They argued that the 
                                                 
 





purported distinction between life-extending and symptom reducing or palliative treatment is 
often not clear cut, and may involve some very difficult trade-offs. The following remarks from 
four different participants describe this problem:  
You can't do a general scenario, "oh should we do life prolonging measure or we 
shouldn't, based on his values?" It's like... well are you giving him oral antibiotics that 
he's taking at home? Or are, is he going to go spend 9 weeks in an ICU, having, you 
know, painful, expensive, intensive things done that we're really not sure are going to 
work, for a 1% chance that he will survive 3 months out of the hospital at the end of 
this? Participant 6 
There are very few treatments in medicine - contrary to popular belief - that are solely 
life prolonging or solely symptom reducing. Most medicines do a bit of both, the 
question is to what extent do they do both? Participant 1 
Because if you look at it- what life umm, prolonging treatments are there? I mean... 
We're talking about like CPR or umm... Antibiotics when he's... Have an infection... 
That, yeah... I guess learning a bit more from him what life prolonging treatment for 
him means umm. Because it can mean different things. Participant 3 
You know, someone gets a urinary tract infection, it's uncomfortable and makes them 
unwell but it probably won't kill them... So it might: they might get an ascending 
infection and pyelonephritis and die. So when, I think… We have to be clear about the 
purpose of our treatment at that point. The purpose is to relieve suffering. It probably 
won't prolong her life. It's possible it might, but probably not. If she gets a really raging 
pneumonia however, then I'm gonna have to think really hard about whether it's 
appropriate to treat that because that pneumonia may well end her life, particularly if 
she's relatively frail. Participant 7 
The additional problem of patients changing their views between issuing the directive and the 
directive being applied was also raised by participants. An example from Participant 3 is 
illustrative: 
I've never done one [an advance directive] with my older people because things can 
change- technology changes, your situation change.... And if you put something down 
on paper that becomes sort of... official and legal, haha. Umm. Yeah. Because this man, 
you know, you talked about - he may suddenly meet a new woman in his life and he 
may choose to live! Rather than not having life sustaining treatment. Participant 3 
These views from participants expressing scepticism of advance directives are in line with the 
conclusions drawn in the previous chapter. The participants generally sought to know more 
about the patient (or case) in question in order to discern whether their decisions were 
meaningful to them, and said they would look for supporting evidence from family members. 
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They also emphasised how each decision should be considered on a case by case basis and 
maintained that a person may be capable of making certain decisions, but incapable of others. 
A different set of concerns about advance directives relate to the place of autonomy in 
determining clinical decisions. One participant spoke about a perceived over-emphasis of 
autonomy as an ethical principle, and suggested that patient’s preferences were not the only 
important factor in making medical decisions:  
Our societies have gone too much to an autonomy focus... There are other ethical 
principles such as beneficence, non-maleficence and justice, in the principle based 
ethics. I think that autonomy has come to be like the only value. And so if it's the only 
value, umm, then the person's medical decisions, would be you know... Well "what 
would he do if he were not moderately demented?" But I think that's thinking on the 
wrong track. It's, it's, the, the doctor is a part of that relationship in guiding that and it 
is not a black and white decision. Participant 6  
Over-valuing autonomy and under-valuing other ethical principles could perhaps push 
clinicians towards an aggressive treatment because a patient requests it, even though the 
clinician believes that the treatment may be more harmful than beneficial. Equally, it could 
lead to clinicians feeling they must always abide by patient’s decisions to refuse treatment, 
even when there are good reasons to doubt that the decisions are well informed. This may be a 
problem throughout medicine but it becomes especially important when considering vulnerable 
patients who have difficulty making decisions or expressing their wishes, such as people with 
dementia or children with mental impairments. In the case of dementia, a historical set of values 
and wishes in the form of an advance directive may be used. However, this carries the problems 
already described: it is difficult to accurately predict what you will want in a situation you have 
not accurately imagined and your values can change over time. An alternative strategy that is 
often employed for people with dementia and usually used for children with mental 
impairments (as they do not have the benefit of an advance directive), is to discuss the decisions 
with those caring for the person and try to work out what is in the patient’s best interests. There 
are of course problems with this also, for example, doctors and family member may hold 
different values to the patient. Moreover, the norms associated with established roles can cloud 
our judgements about what is best. As the same participant explains: 
I think the roles, say of children, of protecting their parent is not nearly as strong as 
protecting a child. So when you get children who are either intellectually disabled or 
very young and parents and doctors try to work together to make medical decisions - 
what's in their best interest? And you have a whole confounder in this idea of 'my job 
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is to fight to my child, my job as a parent, my role as a parent is to fight for my child." 
And they can.... It might be more profound in the US, but they... a lot of the parents get 
into an adversarial role, like no matter what the doctor suggests, since their job is to 
fight, they have to do some... they have to fight for more than what the doctor wants to 
do and so... there's this... and more is always better... I've also had parents... many a 
parent who said "I wouldn't do this, I would never choose this for myself, but I have to 
do it for my child, because I'm their parent and I'm the one fighting for them." 
Participant 6 
These issues regarding the problems of advance directives and their role in decision making 
could be explored further, particularly in the light of national and international efforts to 
promote thinking around end-of-life decisions, and decisions involving patients whose capacity 
is impaired. Following the United Nations Convention on Persons with Disabilities, several 
countries including New Zealand are considering a shift towards ‘supported decision making’ 
instead of ‘substituted decision making’. However, as this participant has pointed out, there are 
still issues within a system that focuses wholly on autonomy.  
5.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have described the findings of a qualitative study exploring how clinicians 
experienced in caring for people with dementia view the philosophical and ethical issues 
discussed in this thesis. Many aspects of the participants’ views are broadly supportive of the 
conclusions drawn in the previous chapter. However, on certain points there is a lack of 
coherence or agreement in how the participants describe or approach difficult ethical situations 
raised by dementia concerning identity. Following this chapter, I will conclude the thesis as a 






In this thesis I have explored the multiple and complex ways that dementia can affect a person’s 
identity. I described several cases in the introduction to this thesis which illustrate some of the 
ethical dilemmas dementia presupposes, in regard to identity. The main concern of this thesis 
were the issues surrounding personal identity, though related issues concerning personhood 
have also been considered. I first approached these issues by outlining various theories of 
identity in Chapter One. Here, I described an important distinction between ‘object theories’ 
that consider identity to persist through an enduring entity, and ‘agency theories’ which instead 
regard a person’s identity as grounded in their actions (or interactions) and the reasons for those 
actions. Within these agency theories, I highlighted that some actions and choices are more 
critical to our identities, and how a person’s roles and relationships also have significant effects 
on these critical choices. The most pervasive object theory is memory theory, based on work 
by John Locke. According to this theory, a person’s autobiographical memories are what 
constituted a person’s enduring identity. In other words, identity is thought to abide in the 
persistence of memories, which are in turn imagined as psychological entities.  
Given the importance of memory in Locke’s widely accepted theory of identity, and the fact 
that memory is impaired in the most common forms of dementia, it was considered necessary 
to undertake a closer examination of what memory is. This was done in Chapter Two. There I 
described the recent paradigm shift in ‘memory studies’ away from an ‘archival model’, which 
conceives remembering as a simple, passive process of retrieving stored information, towards 
a ‘process model’, which regards remembering as an intersubjective process of renegotiation 
of the past. Reiterating work by Jens Brockmeier and Ian O’Loughlin, I provided arguments 
for this newer process model across various fields of memory research, including recent 
neurobiological evidence which refutes the idea of stored memory traces and places memory 
among similar mental processes such as perception and imagination.  
In Chapter Three I provided some descriptive contextual information about dementia. This 
included local and global epidemiological data regarding the significant burden of disease that 
dementia poses to our current and future healthcare systems. I also described a typical clinical 
course of dementia, emphasising the subjective nature of the disease and the significance of 
psychosocial factors. Finally, I described the most common dementia sub-types, giving basic 
information about their pathophysiology, symptomology and treatments. Here, I elucidated a 
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significant distinction between frontotemporal dementia, which spares memory but 
significantly affects a person’s behaviour, and other dementias which present primarily with 
memory difficulties.  
In Chapter Four I re-examined how identity is affected by dementia, in light of what had been 
discussed in the previous chapters. I described a key difference between direct and indirect 
effects and considered how the theories of identity described in Chapter One might explain 
these. In doing this, I argued that object theories at best only partly explained the etiology of 
the identity problems in dementia and neglected important elements of a person’s experience 
with dementia. In place of object theories, I argued for the use of an agency approach to 
personal identity, as these theories fit with the process model of memory, provide a fuller 
explanation of the identity problems that arise in dementia, and are more useful in guiding our 
actions in caring for people with dementia. In reviewing the cases outlined in the introduction, 
I maintained that some choices made by people with dementia can be considered autonomous, 
while others are not. This was grounded on the link that had been drawn between autonomous 
agency and a person’s capacity to attach meaning to the outcomes of a choice. I also offered 
brief remarks on personhood, stating that while it seems that advanced dementia can destroy a 
person qua person, as with any terminal illness, it appears that this may happen before the 
physical death of the person if they are no longer able to engage in any meaningful behaviour. 
I stressed that the point at which this occurs is difficult to delineate and can be somewhat 
relativistic.  
In Chapter Five I described the findings of a qualitative study exploring the views of seven 
clinicians experienced in dementia care. I discussed how the views of these participants were 
broadly supportive of an agency approach, particularly an approach that focuses on a person’s 
roles and relationships. When discussing questions related to advanced care planning, most 
participants approached the problems from a pragmatic standpoint and were sceptical about the 
value or applicability advanced directives. Participants who discussed this matter stressed the 
need to consider these problems on a case-by-case basis.  
There is still much left to explore within this topic. I have only given limited attention to the 
concept of personhood and how it is affected in dementia. A fuller account exploring the kind 
of actions that are meaningful to a person in advanced dementia could be informative. 
Similarly, a more thorough investigation into the effects that FTD has on a person’s agency 
would improve an account of these challenging cases. Investigation into how different families 
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manage the indirect effects that dementia has on identity, and how psychosocial interventions 
can help manage direct effects, could be very useful to those caring for people with dementia.  
It is my hope that the arguments within this thesis convey a coherent (if incomplete) account 
of the myriad ways a person’s identity may be affected by dementia. I also hope that this 
account encourages cherishing people with dementia for the things that they are still capable 
of, and regards them as important members of our moral community. I believe this approach 
cautions against the unnecessary deconstruction of a person’s identity through misinterpreting 
a person with dementia’s actions and promotes an optimistic perspective on the degree of 
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